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I. INTRODUCTION 
Punishing prior offenders more severely than first offenders is a 
principle that legislatures in this country have endorsed with unique 
enthusiasm.1  Statutes instruct judges to use criminal history when 
selecting an appropriate sentence from within the range designated for 
an offense2 and regularly increase the range of punishment3 for prior 
offenders beyond what would be permissible for defendants with clean 
records.4  This Essay argues that statutes that increase penalties for 
repeat offenders too often fail to accomplish their intended purposes 
and that the procedures used to impose such sentences are 
constitutionally suspect.5 
 
1. JULIAN V. ROBERTS, PUNISHING PERSISTENT OFFENDERS: EXPLORING 
COMMUNITY AND OFFENDER PERSPECTIVES 2–3 (2008) (“[C]riminal record is more 
important than any other aggravating or mitigating factor.”); id. at 12, 116 (comparing 
sentencing law in several other countries where prior offenses lead to much smaller increases 
in punishment); Michael Tonry, Race, Ethnicity, and Punishment, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 53, 77 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz 
eds., 2012) (noting that unlike most countries that increase sentences for new crimes by a few 
months for prior convictions, in the United States “the ‘recidivist premium’ often doubles or 
triples the sentence”).  For additional comparative treatment, see generally volume 76, issue 1 
of Law and Contemporary Problems (2013). 
2. E.g., Kevin R. Reitz, The Illusion of Proportionality: Desert and Repeat Offenders, in 
PREVIOUS CONVICTIONS AT SENTENCING: THEORETICAL AND APPLIED PERSPECTIVES 
137, 138–43 (Julian V. Roberts & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2010) [hereinafter Roberts & von 
Hirsch] (noting statutes may designate the weight criminal history should carry); Michael 
Tonry, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Prediction of Recidivism 11 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. 
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-51, 2013) (“Under most 
sentencing guidelines systems, third or fourth convictions can result in sentences two-to-four 
times longer than are received by first offenders.”). 
3. See Nancy J. King & Brynn E. Applebaum, Alleyne on the Ground, Facts Affecting 
Eligibility for Probation and Parole (work in progress) (on file with authors) (collecting state 
statutes increasing minimum terms of incarceration).  
4. The most well-known examples are three strikes laws and dangerous, persistent, 
multiple, habitual, or career offender laws.  See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 22-1804 (Supp. 2012) 
(providing that a repeat offender can receive three times the statutory maximum if the 
offender has been convicted of the same or a similar crime twice before); Beth Caldwell, 
Twenty-Five to Life for Adolescent Mistakes: Juvenile Strikes as Cruel and Unusual 
Punishment, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 581, 645–53 (2012) (collecting two and three strikes laws in 
appendix).  A prior conviction may aggravate murder to a capital offense, e.g., FLA. STAT. 
§ 921.141(5)(b) (Supp. 2013), or a misdemeanor to a felony, e.g., People v. Barclay, 159 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 277, 280–81 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013); People v. Schreiber, 226 P.3d 1221, 1223 (Colo. 
App. 2009) (collecting authority from other states).  In Wisconsin, a prior conviction can 
transform a civil infraction into a criminal offense.  State v. Verhagen, 827 N.W.2d 891, 896 
(Wis. Ct. App. 2013).  
5. This Essay does not address Eighth Amendment concerns about repeat-offender 
punishment or the use of criminal history in investigation, pretrial release, corrections 
administration, or parole.  
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Part I traces the history of efforts to identify which defendants have 
criminal records, a story important to both claims.  Part II explains why 
repeat-offender penalties fall short of goals for deterrence, 
incapacitation, and retribution, and how relying heavily on criminal 
history in setting sentences contributes to the racially lopsided profile of 
punishment in America today.  Turning to the constitutional regulation 
of the sentencing process, Part III critiques the potential justifications 
for the prior-conviction exception to the rule in Apprendi v. New Jersey6 
and argues that the exception should be abandoned. 
II. REPEAT-OFFENDER PUNISHMENT: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
A. Punishing the Marked Offender: Colonial Times Through the 1830s 
In early America, various statutes mandated stiffer sentences for 
repeat offenders.7  But without photography or fingerprints, courts had 
no reliable way of determining if a defendant was lying about his past.  
Court records included the name and age of each convicted person, 
information easily fabricated by those accused of a subsequent charge.  
To cope, early American courts often used the same cheap identification 
method used in Europe for centuries—marking or branding the body of 
the person convicted.8 
Branding first offenders was a common practice after the Founding 
that lasted into the early nineteenth century.  Many felonies were 
punishable by execution, but a defendant convicted for the first time 
could seek “benefit of clergy,” essentially a reprieve from execution 
granted at the discretion of the judge.  If granted, the defendant would 
be branded instead of put to death.9  For example, in 1801, future 
 
6. 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that the right to a jury finding of every element of a 
criminal offense is violated when facts that increase the sentencing range beyond that 
permitted for the offense of conviction are found at sentencing by a judge).  
7. SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF FINGERPRINTING AND 
CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 13–14 (2d prtg. 2002); JOHN PRATT, GOVERNING THE 
DANGEROUS: DANGEROUSNESS, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 9 (1997).  For example, in East 
Jersey, a third-offense drunkard could be whipped.  A first- and second-offense thief had to 
make full restitution.  SAMUEL WALKER, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 32–33 (2d ed. 1998).  A 1779 Virginia law provided escalating penalties 
for sellers of diseased or unwholesome meat, bread, or drink, including pillory for a second 
offense, imprisonment and fine for a third offense, and six months hard labor “every time 
after.”  An Act Prescribing the Punishment of Those Who Sell Unwholesome Meat or Drink, 
ch. 53 (1779), 12 Laws Va. 336 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823); see also infra note 12. 
8. COLE, supra note 7, at 7; ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 4–6 (discussing the benefit of 
clergy and branding in England). 
9. Marci A. Hamilton, Religious Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public 
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president Andrew Jackson, sitting as a judge in Tennessee, granted 
benefit of clergy to a fellow convicted of delivering a “mortal bruise” to 
a man’s head with an oak plank.  According to the court records, the 
defendant was immediately “burned in the left hand with the letter M.”10  
The brand identified him as a convicted felon and prevented him from 
claiming the privilege a second time, guaranteeing that any additional 
felony would be his last.11  Marking bodies was also used for non-capital 
crimes in the eighteenth century.  The punishment for some first 
offenders was to lose one ear; second offenders lost the other.12   
 
Good, BYU L. REV. 1099, 1132 (2004) (noting that the “benefit of clergy never functioned as 
a special privilege for clergy” in the colonies and was instead “merely a tool” to avoid 
applying the death penalty to first-time felonies); e.g., Act of Nov. 27, 1789, ch. 22, § 5, 1789 
Va. Acts 14, 15 (providing that for crimes “allowed benefit of clergy the person shall be 
burned in the hand for every such offence”); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Anne F. Jacobs, 
The “Law Only As an Enemy”: The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the 
Colonial and Antebellum Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C. L. REV. 969, 1009–10 (1992) 
(discussing the use of clergy and branding); Nancy J. King, The Origins of Felony Jury 
Sentencing in the United States, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 937, 948 (2003); John H. Langbein, 
Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View From the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 37–41, 37 n.145 (1983); see also Jack Kenny Williams, Crime and Punishment in South 
Carolina, 1790–1860, 233, 246–49, 298 (1953) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory 
University) (on file with Emory University Library and author) (reporting that, in South 
Carolina, twenty-two crimes carried the death penalty as late as 1850 and branding 
“ceremonies,” used until 1833 for those “clergied,” were well attended, and courts would 
burn the letter T, for thief, and M, for manslaughter, into thumb, cheek, or, in rare cases, 
forehead). 
10. State v. Childress (Mero Dist. Super. Ct. Nov. 19, 1801) (order allowing benefit of 
clergy), as reprinted in ANDREW JACKSON, LEGAL PAPERS OF ANDREW JACKSON 213–15 
(James W. Ely, Jr. & Theodore Brown, Jr. eds., 1988); see also State v. Humphreys, 1 Tenn. 
306, 307 (Tenn. Super. L. & Eq. 1808) (noting the court’s pronounced sentence for a horse 
thief convicted in 1808: “That he be branded in the presence of the Court, on the inside of the 
left hand with the letter H, and on the inside of the right hand with the letter T, between the 
hours of twelve and four o’clock this day, and immediately taken to the common whipping-
post, and there receive thirty-nine lashes on his bare back”). 
11. Some evidence suggests that the marking of offenders was not consistently 
employed.  By 1774, branding with a cold iron was habitual practice in Virginia, prompting 
the author of a leading treatise on the justices of the peace in Virginia to remark that 
branding “can scarcely be called even so much as a slight Punishment, but rather a piece of 
absurd Pageantry” as the “Iron” is “scarcely heated.”  King, supra note 9, at 948 (citing Hugh 
F. Rankin, Criminal Trial Proceedings in the General Court of Colonial Virginia, 72 VA. MAG. 
HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 50, 67 (1964) (quoting RICHARD STARKE, THE OFFICE AND 
AUTHORITY OF A JUSTICE OF PEACE EXPLAINED AND DIGESTED, UNDER PROPER TITLES 
87–88 (1774))). 
12. A 1705 Virginia statute commanded that those sentenced for stealing a pig for the 
second time should also be rendered earless.  L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., Recidivism and 
Virginia’s “Come-Back” Law, 48 VA. L. REV. 597, 598 (1962) (citing An Act Against Stealing 
Hogs, ch. 14 (1705), 3 Laws of Va. 276–77 (William Waller Hening ed., 1823)); see also 
GEORGE W. DALZELL, BENEFIT OF CLERGY IN AMERICA & RELATED MATTERS 245–47 
(1955) (discussing branding and ear cropping provisions in Vermont, not abolished until 1797, 
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Although branding was abolished in federal courts in 1790, it 
persisted in the states.13  In state courts, branding was replaced by terms 
of incarceration only gradually over several decades, as states built their 
first prisons and enacted new criminal codes.14  Branding was part of 
sentencing in Tennessee through the 1820s,15 persisted in South Carolina 
until 1833,16 and did not end in North Carolina until 1854.17 
B. Discovering the Recidivist—Penitentiaries and the Deviant Type—
1820–1880 
The construction of the first penitentiaries ushered in a new form of 
punishment: lengthy terms of incarceration.  Prisons were, in theory, 
places of “penitence and reformation,” where criminals could be 
removed from corrupting influences though discipline and be “cured” of 
their criminality.18  In practice, prisons in many states were 
“extraordinarily brutal” places where more than one in six prisoners 
died in custody.19  If a released offender was convicted of another crime, 
the spurned opportunity for penitence provided a justification for more 
 
and branding as punishment for manslaughter and larceny in Texas, not ended until 1848).  
“Ear cropping” was also an authorized punishment in North Carolina.  Id. at 258, 260. 
13. DALZELL, supra note 12, at 233–35 (noting that in 1778 “benefit of clergy was an 
incident of the criminal law in twelve of the signatory states” where it persisted for more than 
ninety years, although eliminated in federal courts in 1790).   
14. Jeffrey K. Sawyer, “Benefit of Clergy” in Maryland and Virginia, 34 AM. J. LEGAL 
HIST. 49, 66–67 (1990) (noting that the benefit of clergy was abolished in Virginia in 1796 and 
Maryland in 1807 by laws providing that every person convicted of felonies before deemed 
clergyable shall undergo imprisonment, and noting that Virginia’s new law coincided with 
construction of a new prison in Richmond).  For a listing of the dates that each state built its 
first penitentiary and enacted a new criminal code, see King, supra note 9, at 990–93. 
15. E.g., Crenshaw v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 122, 123 (1827) (noting that sentence 
for horse thief included being “branded in the brawn of the left thumb H. T.”). 
16. Williams, supra note 9, at 233; see also JACKSON, supra note 10, at 213 (branding 
ended in Tennessee in 1829).  For slaves, however, the practice continued.  In Virginia, for 
example, convicted slaves who escaped hanging or being sold to slave traders as punishment, 
see generally Philip J. Schwarz, The Transportation of Slaves from Virginia, 1801–1865, 7 
SLAVERY & ABOLITION 215 (1986), were considered too valuable to incarcerate in Virginia’s 
new penitentiary.  Instead, they were “burned in the palm of the left hand with a hot poker” 
in court, then “taken immediately to the whipping post” and lashed.  Robert M. Saunders, 
Crime and Punishment in Early National America: Richmond, Virginia, 1784–1820, 86 VA. 
MAG. OF HIST. & BIOGRAPHY, Jan. 1978, at 33, 42. 
17. DALZELL, supra note 12, at 259–60. 
18. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 77–
82 (1993). 
19. Id. at 90 (noting that, in 1870, 41% of Alabama prisoners died and that, during the 
two prior years, the figure had been 17% and 18%, respectively).  The official death rates 
were often lowered by pardoning inmates who were near death.  Id. 
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severe punishment.20  Prisons allowed legislatures to proportion criminal 
penalties, increasing the term of incarceration with each additional 
unheeded lesson.  When it opened its penitentiary in 1817, 
Massachusetts, for example, amended its code to mandate an extra 
seven years for every offender with one prior conviction and life in 
prison for those with two prior convictions21—one of the earlier “three-
strikes-and-you’re-out statutes” in the United States.22 
Penitentiaries also offered hope of more effective identification of 
prior offenders.  A single state list replaced decentralized county 
conviction records and included descriptions of marks, scars, or tattoos 
on each prisoner’s body.23  But these rudimentary records of the bodies 
entering and leaving prisons were still organized only by name.  It was 
not possible to look up a person by a missing toe or unusual scar.  
Moreover, as Alexis de Tocqueville reported after observing these early 
penitentiaries, identification was possible only if an offender was 
returned to prison in the same state.24  Judges were aware that many 
“first offenders” were actually repeat offenders, whose true identities 
might, or might not, be revealed later when someone recognized them in 
prison.  As de Tocqueville concluded, noting how easily a person could 
pass from state to state, “the courts condemn, almost always, without 
knowing the true name of the criminal, and still less his previous life.”25 
 
20. Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 747–48 (1852) (“[T]he mischief was a 
want of reformation . . . the legislature intended that the culprit should first hear the monitory 
voice of the law before the heavier doom should be announced . . . .”). 
21. Commonwealth v. Phillips, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 28, 31–32 (1831) (describing statute of 
1818); PRATT, supra note 7, at 9.  Virginia had a similar scheme.  L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., 
supra note 12, at 598–99 (describing revised code of 1819 with graded enhancements). 
22. Other states during this period passed laws punishing second-time thieves more 
severely.  See, e.g., Stevens v. People, 1 Hill 261, 262–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).  In England, this 
sort of law was not used until the usual means of ridding the country of the unwanted 
convicted criminals—deportation to the British colonies, including Australia—was phased out 
in 1869.  See COLE, supra note 7, at 18.   
23. COLE, supra note 7, at 10–11; ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 6. 
24. COLE, supra note 7, at 17 (“‘If . . . a delivered convict commits a new crime under a 
fictitious name, he can very easily conceal his relapse, providing he is not brought back to the 
prison where he underwent his first punishment. . . .  [T]here is no central power to which the 
police officers might refer to obtain information respecting the previous life of an indicted 
person . . . .’” (quoting G. DE BEAUMONT & A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY 
SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES, AND ITS APPLICATION IN FRANCE 72 (Francis Leiber 
trans., S. Ill. Univ. Press 1964) (1833))). 
25. See Wayne A. Logan, Policing Identity, 92 B. U. L. REV. 1561, 1564 (2012) (quoting 
BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 24, at 101–02); COLE, supra note 7, at 17. 
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Legislatures recognized this too, and a few states in the early 1800s 
changed their laws to address it.  At the end of the eighteenth century, 
every state followed the established common law rule: any prior 
conviction that would boost the sentence had to be alleged in the 
indictment and proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.26  But when 
the Massachusetts legislature learned that supposed first offenders were 
being recognized as former inmates when they arrived at the new 
penitentiary, it passed a statute that provided an alternative to the 
common law rule.  Whenever the warden recognized a person as a prior 
offender, he had to notify the state’s attorney, who in turn had to charge 
the prisoner as a repeat offender in a supplemental charging document 
called an information.27  The prisoner would then be brought from 
prison back to court.  If his past conviction was admitted or proven to a 
new jury beyond a reasonable doubt,28 he would be sentenced to the 
punishment mandated for second offenders (seven years) or third 
offenders (life), as the case may be.29  Through the nineteenth century, 
most states continued to require the prosecutor to allege in the 
indictment any former convictions that would increase an offender’s 
sentence and prove those convictions along with the charge.30  But a 
handful of states adopted processes similar to that in Massachusetts, so 
that when an alias was exposed at the penitentiary, the sentence of the 
newly identified defendant could be increased.31   
As cities grew during the Industrial Revolution, crime was 
increasingly blamed on a small class of repeat or “habitual” offenders,32 
considered biologically inferior to normal, law-abiding citizens.33  
Phrenologists and craniologists attempted to identify the physical 
manifestations of criminality, scientists searched for its biological 
 
26. See infra notes 140, 144–47. 
27. See Plumbly v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 413, 415 (1841); In re Ross, 19 
Mass. (2 Pick.) 165, 183 (1824).  
28. E.g., Commonwealth v. Briggs, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 429, 438 (1827) (“No presumptions 
are to be made against the prisoner.  The government must prove every essential 
allegation.”). 
29. Plumbly, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) at 416–17; In re Ross, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) at 167; see also 
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 28, 34 (1831) (“This proceeding by information 
to award additional punishment where sentence has already been pronounced, is founded 
solely on statute, is not known at the common law, is in a high degree penal, and therefore is 
not to be extended by construction beyond the cases clearly contemplated by the statute.”). 
30. See infra notes 140, 143–44. 
31. See infra note 140. 
32. COLE, supra note 7, at 10–15 (noting that this belief was encouraged by crime 
statistics, which began to appear in the 1820s).  
33. Id. at 13.   
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causes,34 and legislatures expanded punishment for repeat offenders.35  
Yet, as the U.S. Civil War ended, courts still had no practical, reliable 
way to determine who had been convicted before.36  Criminal 
identification continued to depend upon personal recognition by 
sheriffs, prosecutors, judges, and wardens.37 
C. Technology to the Rescue—Photos, Bertillonage, and Fingerprints—
1880–1930 
By 1930, identification of past offenders had completely changed.  
Photography began the transformation.  The very first “rogues gallery” 
was displayed at the New York Police Department, with 450 
ambrotypes in that collection by 1858.  Photography became more 
accessible in the 1870s and 1880s, and by the late nineteenth century, 
police departments all over the world had a gallery, or registry, of 
photographs of the faces of past offenders associated with various 
names.38  But there remained no efficient way to search hundreds of 
photographs. 
This problem was solved by a revolutionary system of identification 
invented in France by Alfonse Bertillon.39  Using an index of eleven 
bodily measurements rather than names, the Bertillon system identified 
a prisoner in minutes.  It won over the wardens in New York and 
Illinois, who mandated measurements for all inmates by the 1890s.40  
Prisons and police departments in other states followed suit.  
Fingerprinting was not far behind.  In the 1880s, immigration 
authorities in California used it to identify Chinese immigrants who had 
been granted return certificates, but not until 1904 was it introduced to 
law enforcement to supplement or replace the Bertillon system.  
 
34. Id. at 15. 
35. E.g., State v. Wilbor, 1 R.I. 199, 199–200 (1846) (discussing an 1844 statute).  States 
that had formerly punished as recidivists those who had been to their own state’s penitentiary 
expanded their laws to reach those who had been convicted of felonies in other states.  E.g., 
Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 740–41 (1852). 
36. For a while, officials in Britain attempted to maintain a national “Distinctive Marks 
Register,” an index of scars and other marks, but it would take a clerk between ten and ninety 
hours to identify a person using the cumbersome process, which required first looking up the 
mark by body part, then by type of mark, then by location on the body part, and so on.  
However, by 1877, the register only applied to individuals identified as habitual criminals 
through other means because it became too expensive to maintain.  COLE, supra note 7, at 27. 
37. Id. at 10–11. 
38. Id. at 22.  
39. Id. at 32. 
40. Id. at 53, 55. 
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Fingerprinting was first used in criminal cases in New York City for 
women, as Bertillon operators reportedly found it awkward to measure 
the body parts of prostitutes.  Once fingerprinting was extended to men 
in 1913,41 within four years the Magistrates’ Court of New York City 
reportedly identified 31,000 individuals.42  Gradually, fingerprinting 
replaced Bertillonage so that by the end of the 1930s fingerprinting was 
the dominant method for identification.43 
D. Parole and Probation for Some, Incapacitation for the Dangerous—
1890–1970 
The new means of identifying repeat criminals reinforced the belief 
that a small group of offenders committed most crime.44  “Instinctive 
criminals,” it was argued in 1891, could be identified by their “ill-shaped 
heads”; “asymmetrical faces”; “deformed, . . . ill-developed bodies”; 
“abnormal conditions of the genital organs”; “large, heavy jaws”; 
“outstanding ears”; and “a restless, animal-like, or brutal expression.”45  
“Criminal anthropologists” asserted that recidivists were “smaller in 
stature with longer and broader heads,” with “furtive restless eyes,” and 
that a primary cause of recidivism is “physical and mental degeneracy of 
the hereditary and acquired types.”46  Many thought they should be 
segregated from society like the criminally insane.47  Eventually, sixteen 
states passed laws authorizing the sterilization of habitual criminals,48 a 
 
41. Id. at 155–58. 
42. People v. Sallow, 165 N.Y.S. 915, 918 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1917) (citing FINGER PRINT 
BUREAU, REPORT OF ALFRED A. HART, in ANNUAL REPORT, CITY MAGISTRATES’ 
COURTS, CITY OF NEW YORK 102, 103 (1915)).  
43. COLE, supra note 7, at 32, 229–32 (noting that Bertillonage was still in use in the 
1930s); see also Kelley v. State, 185 N.E. 453, 456 (Ind. 1933) (noting testimony by Bertillon 
expert). 
44. COLE, supra note 7, at 29.   
45. S.A.K. STRAHAN, INSTINCTIVE CRIMINALITY: ITS TRUE CHARACTER AND 
RATIONAL TREATMENT 189 (John Bale & Sons 1891). 
46. J.F. SUTHERLAND, RECIDIVISM: HABITUAL CRIMINALITY, AND HABITUAL PETTY 
DELINQUENCY 59 (1908); see also COLE, supra note 7, at 26 (discussing attempts to create a 
composite face of known criminals, an effort that Cole says “became a crude pretext for 
prejudices, such as the association of criminality with . . .  Eastern and Southern Europeans, 
Jews, Gypsies and others who simply looked lower class”); WALKER, supra note 7, at 113 
(noting that Americans saw the immigrants as bringing more crime in the early 1900s). 
47. L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 600 & nn.25–26. 
48. PRATT, supra note 7, at 49–50 (“For the proponents of eugenics, mere exclusion 
from the rest of society for life as a punishment for the habituals was not enough: they should 
also be denied any opportunity for reproducing their kind to prevent a continuation of their 
diseased lineage . . .  [S]terilisation was introduced to the penal programme in sixteen State 
jurisdictions in the United States.”). 
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practice not struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court until 1942.49  
Leading scholars such as Norval Morris considered the eugenics effect 
of protracted detention of habitual criminals “possibly scientifically 
fruitful.”50 
The new identification techniques also reassured legislatures that 
penalties for recidivists would no longer be applied arbitrarily, that is, 
only to those whose attempts to hide their pasts happened to fail.51  
Recidivist statutes flourished in the 1890s and early decades of the 
twentieth century.52  For example, anyone convicted in New York53 or 
Missouri54 of a felony with a life sentence as the possible maximum got 
life as the mandatory sentence if he had been previously convicted of a 
felony or petit theft.  Some laws targeted those who committed 
particular offenses, such as second-time gamblers,55 thieves,56 drug 
possessors,57 or liquor sellers.58  By 1930, Congress had passed a law 
 
49. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942).  See generally PAUL A. LOMBARDO, 
THREE GENERATIONS, NO IMBECILES: EUGENICS, THE SUPREME COURT, AND BUCK V. 
BELL (2008); VICTORIA F. NOURSE, IN RECKLESS HANDS: SKINNER V. OKLAHOMA AND 
THE NEAR TRIUMPH OF AMERICAN EUGENICS (2008). 
50. NORVAL MORRIS, THE HABITUAL CRIMINAL 22, 24 n.2 (1951) (citing HERMANN 
MANNHEIM, CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 226–37 (Karl Mannheim 
ed., 1st ed. 1946)). 
51. COLE, supra note 7, at 5. 
52. PRATT, supra note 7, at 35 (noting that “recidivist statutes reached the zenith of their 
popularity . . . in the late 1920s” and 1930s just as fingerprinting was becoming routine 
(quoting George K. Brown, Note, The Treatment of the Recidivist in the United States, 23 
CAN. B. REV. 640, 642 (1945)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also In re Miller, 68 
N.W. 990, 990 (Mich. 1896) (describing a statute limiting “good time” for second offenders); 
Blackburn v. State, 36 N.E. 18, 20 (Ohio 1893) (describing Section 2 of an act that passed the 
Ohio legislature on May 4, 1885, which mandated life sentences for third-time offenders). 
53. Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 55–56 (1914); PRATT, supra note 7, at 35 
(describing a 1907 law in New York). 
54. See Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676 (1895); State v. Austin, 21 S.W. 31, 32 (Mo. 
1893). 
55. E.g., Wolf v. State, 206 S.W. 39 (Ark. 1918) (discussing how Act 55, of the Acts of 
1907, punished the second offense for betting on horses more severely). 
56. E.g., State v. Jones, 128 F. 626, 627 (S.D. Iowa 1904) (describing an 1898 act); In re 
Boggs, 45 F. 475, 475 (C.C.D. Ky. 1891) (providing that third-time larceny carried life 
sentence); Kelley v. People, 4 N.E. 644, 644–45 (Ill. 1886) (describing an 1883 act); Evans v. 
State, 50 N.E. 820, 820 (Ind. 1898) (describing an 1894 act); State v. Loehr, 5 S.W. 696, 696 
(Mo. 1887). 
57. People v. Mock Don Yuen, 227 P. 948, 949 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1924) (narcotics). 
58. Banas v. People, 211 P. 367, 367 (Colo. 1922); State v. Watson, 142 P. 956, 956 (Kan. 
1914); State v. Adams, 132 P. 171, 172 (Kan. 1913); see also Cross v. State, 78 Ala. 430, 432 
(1885) (describing a statute that punished a second conviction for the offense of living in 
adultery with the same person with a more-severe penalty). 
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punishing Prohibition violators more severely for subsequent offenses,59 
and twenty-three states had passed new habitual offender laws, many 
providing for a mandatory life sentence for the third or fourth felony 
conviction.60  
Lawmakers also developed a particular interest in the dangerousness 
of sexual offenders, and twenty-six states introduced laws authorizing 
lifetime imprisonment of those adjudged to be “sexual psychopaths.”61  
By 1949, thirty-two states had established criminal identification 
bureaus, and the number of states with habitual felony offender statutes 
had grown to forty-three—five of these states mandated life for the third 
offense, ten for the fourth offense, and another ten permitted the judge 
discretion to sentence a third or fourth striker to life in prison.62 
The new identification techniques facilitated greater leniency as well 
as severity.  By convincing legislators that corrections officials and 
judges could sort first offenders more likely to be rehabilitated from 
hardened criminals, improvements in criminal identification enabled 
new statutes authorizing release on conditions and the beginning of 
probation and parole.63   
 
59. United States v. Lindquist, 285 F. 447 (W.D. Wash. 1921) (discussing the National 
Prohibition Act, which prescribed a greater punishment for “a second or subsequent offense” 
and provided that the prosecuting officer shall “plead the prior conviction”).  This was not the 
first federal repeat-offender provision.  Congress imposed a mandatory minimum of twenty-
five years in prison for second-time mail thieves in 1909.  Comp. Stat. 1449, § 197 (John A. 
Mallory) (Supp. 1909). 
60. COLE, supra note 7, at 217; L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 599 n.17; see also 
PRATT, supra note 7, at 35 (quoting Brown, supra note 52, at 640, 640–83). 
61. PRATT, supra note 7, at 70, 93–95 (citing Alan H. Swanson, Sexual Psychopath 
Statutes: Summary and Analysis, 51 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY, & POLICE SCI. 215, 215–27 
(1960)) (stating that “homosexuality, psychopathy and paedophilia were likely to be conflated 
to produce the image of the middle-aged sex fiend, with children as his target”).  In 1937, J. 
Edgar Hoover penned an article titled War on the Sex Criminal, which begins with this: 
“[T]he sex fiend, most loathsome of all the vast army of crime, has become a threat to the 
safety of American childhood and womanhood.”  See COLE, supra note 7 (citation omitted). 
62. See Paul W. Tappan, Habitual Offender Laws in the United States, 13 FED. 
PROBATION 28, 28 (1949) (“Analysis has revealed that fairly well-standardized multiple 
offender statutes for habitual felons exist in 43 of the 48 states . . . .”). 
63. COLE, supra note 7, at 218 (discussing that, with increased confidence, they could 
provide probation or parole for novices in crime who might still be rehabilitated, and that 
parole began to be used for some recidivists after World War I); WALKER, supra note 7, at 
118–23.   
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E. A Punitive Turn—Three Strikes and Other Mandatory Sentencing 
Laws—1970 on 
After several decades of attempts to diagnose and treat what was 
considered to be the disease of recidivism,64 legislators decided to rein in 
the discretion of judges and parole authorities and rewrote sentencing 
laws in every state.  One of the most frequent changes was an increase in 
penalties for repeat offenders.65  As a dozen states and the federal 
government adopted judicial sentencing guidelines, commissions keyed 
sentences to criminal history.66  In states that retained parole, new 
recidivism laws included provisions denying or delaying parole eligibility 
for repeat offenders.67  By 1996, twenty-four states and the federal 
government had passed new, stricter three strikes laws.68  In some states, 
such as California and Washington, these laws were enacted by ballot 
initiative.69  California’s law provided that anyone with a first-strike 
offense on his record must receive a doubled prison sentence for a 
 
64. E.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 18, at 160; ALASTAIR W. MACLEOD, RECIDIVISM: A 
DEFICIENCY DISEASE (1965). 
65. COLE, supra note 7, at 217–18; Christopher T. Link & Neal Shover, The Origins of 
Criminal Sentencing Reforms, 3 JUST. Q. 329, 334 (1986).   
66. Tonry, supra note 2, at 3–4 (discussing parole guidelines using “salient factors” that 
predict recidivism adopted by U.S. Parole Commission and several other states). 
67. For example, Florida in 1988 denied parole eligibility for the first fifteen years of 
imprisonment to habitual violent felony offenders.  See 1988 Fla. Laws 708 (amending Fla. 
Stat. § 775.084(4)(b)1 (1988)). 
68. JOHN CLARK, JAMES AUSTIN & D. ALAN HENRY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, 
“THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT”: A REVIEW OF STATE LEGISLATION 1 (1997) (twenty-
four states enacted three strikes laws between 1993 and 1995); Ely Aharonson, Determinate 
Sentencing and American Exceptionalism: The Underpinnings and Effects of Cross-National 
Differences in the Regulation of Sentencing Discretion, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 166 
(2013) (noting Congress created a range of fiscal incentives for states to enact three strikes 
laws); COLE, supra note 7, at 223; Michael Tonry, Penal Developments in America, in PENAL 
REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES 20 (Michael Tonry ed., 2001); see also Michael Tonry, 
Sentencing in America, 1975–2025, at 24 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 13-44, 2013) (noting that the laws mandating at least 
twenty-five years have a “sleeper effect”—those first sentenced under them are still serving 
their twenty-five-year terms).  Alaska added its three strikes law a decade later in 2006.  See 
Tonry, Sentencing in America 1975–2025, supra, at 11 n.5 (citing Elsa Y. Chen, Impacts of 
“Three Strikes and You’re Out” on Crime Trends in California and Throughout the United 
States, 24 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 345, 349 (2008)). 
69. VANESSA BARKER, THE POLITICS OF IMPRISONMENT: HOW THE DEMOCRATIC 
PROCESS SHAPES THE WAY AMERICA PUNISHES OFFENDERS 118 (2009); FRANKLIN E. 
ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS & SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE 
STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA 11 (2001); Aharonson, supra note 68, at 176–77; 
Robert Heglin, A Flurry of Recidivist Legislation Means: “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” 20 
J. LEGIS. 213, 222 (1994).  
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subsequent conviction and anyone with two priors must be sentenced to 
a term of twenty-five years to life for a third felony offense.70  
The effects of these laws have varied by state.  In most, repeat-
offender sentences are uncommon.71  But in Washington State as of last 
year, nearly 70% of the 637 prisoners serving life-without-parole 
sentences were sentenced under the state’s three strikes law.72  In 
California, where a second strike carries a doubled sentence and the 
third strike carries twenty-five years to life, the effect was huge: 
maximum sentences statewide grew 6% longer, and the odds of a prison 
sentence rose by nearly 23%.73  As of 2009, one of every four state 
prisoners in California was serving a second- or third-strike sentence,74 
and of these, 55% were convicted of a nonviolent offense.75  Florida and 
 
70. CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKER FELONS IN THE 
ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION (2012). 
71. Chen, supra note 68, 345, 350–51 (compiling the results of telephone and e-mail 
interviews with state criminal justice authorities conducted in the fall of 2006 to determine the 
frequency of use of two and three strikes provisions and noting every state other than 
California reported fewer than 400 second- and third-strike convictions since passage; with 
Washington, Nevada, South Carolina, and Virginia reporting more than 300; Pennsylvania, 
Arkansas, Wisconsin, New Jersey, Vermont, Maryland, Florida, Alaska, and Connecticut 
reporting rare use (just a few prisoners total or up to a dozen at most per year); and Montana 
and Utah reporting their laws have never been used); Yan Zhang, Christopher D. Maxwell & 
Michael S. Vaughn, The Impact of State Sentencing Policies on the U.S. Prison Population, 37 
J. CRIM. JUST. 190, 197 (2009) (noting studies of the explosion in prison population between 
early 1970s and 2000 found three-strikes laws “had little national impact because few 
offenders outside of California, Florida, and Georgia were ever sentenced under [these] 
provision[s]” (citing Walter J. Dickey & Pam Hollenhorst, Three-Strikes Laws: Five Years 
Later, CORR. MGMT. Q., Summer 1999, at 1–8; VINCENT SCHIRALDI ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY 
INST., THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE OUT: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF 3-STRIKE 
LAWS 10 YEARS AFTER THEIR ENACTMENT 4–5 (2004))). 
72. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE 
SENTENCES IN AMERICA 16 (2013), available at http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
inc_Life%20Goes%20On%202013.pdf.   
73. John R. Sutton, Symbol and Substance: Effects of California’s Three Strikes Law on 
Felony Sentencing, 47 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 37, 66 (2013). 
74. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 589 n.44 (citing CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., 
INMATES SENTENCED UNDER THE THREE STRIKES LAW AND A SMALL NUMBER OF 
INMATES RECEIVING SPECIALTY HEALTH CARE REPRESENT SIGNIFICANT COSTS 1 (2010)); 
see also CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. &  REHAB., SECOND AND THIRD STRIKE FELONS IN THE 
ADULT INSTITUTION POPULATION tbls.1, 6 (showing 42,417 prisoners in California were 
serving second- and third-strike sentences, 1,900 of the inmates were over sixty years old, 
6,000 of the offenses were drug crimes, and 11,000 of the offenses were property crimes). 
75. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 72, at 16.  Also, from 1999 to 2012, the 
number of LWOP sentences doubled, and the percentage of LWOP prisoners sentenced 
under California’s three strikes law grew from 7% to 68%.  Id. 
KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:15 PM 
2014] SENTENCING AND PRIOR CONVICTIONS 537 
Georgia also saw large numbers of people incarcerated under their three 
strike laws.76   
Today this background sets the stage for two of the challenges that 
repeat-offender penalties pose for courts and legislatures.  First is the 
escalating attack on the recidivist premiums as miscalibrated and 
unjustified given the purposes of punishment.  The other is the 
questionable constitutionality of the process many jurisdictions use to 
impose longer sentences for offenders with prior convictions. 
III. JUSTIFYING AND CALIBRATING PENALTIES FOR REPEAT 
OFFENDERS: THE MISMATCH BETWEEN THEORY, RESEARCH, AND 
PRACTICE 
Repeat-offender penalties—as applied—too often fail to accomplish 
their intended purposes, and these penalties may carry unanticipated 
costs.  Exactly which aims of criminal punishment these penalties should 
promote is a question that continues to generate debate, with advocates 
falling into one of two camps.  On one side are consequentialists who 
believe additional punishment is warranted if it deters future crime or 
incapacitates the dangerous.  On the other side are retributivists who 
believe such punishment is legitimate only if it reflects increased 
culpability.77  But even if a legislature could decide which theory it cares 
about most,78 repeat-offender penalties are poorly designed to achieve 
either. 
A. Deterrence: Weak Effects 
Proponents of repeat-offender provisions have argued that 
escalating penalties deter convicted offenders from committing 
additional crimes.79  Yet research testing this hypothesis shows that 
 
76. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 629 n.288 (citing SCHIRALDI ET AL., supra note 71, at 4). 
77. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 29.  Rehabilitation is also a potential basis for more 
lenient sentences for first offenders but is difficult to reconcile with “harsher or more 
intrusive sentences each time the offender is reconvicted” and, in any event, appears much 
less important to policymakers than deterrence and incapacitation in discussions of this topic.  
Id. at 36. 
78. Id. at ch. 8 (noting that public opinion and legislative statements seem to support 
both theories—desert and dangerousness; both believe in a greater probability of future 
offending and greater culpability). 
79. E.g., Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 54–55 (1937) (explaining that 
“[p]ersistence in crime and failure of earlier discipline effectively to deter or reform justify 
more drastic treatment” is analogous to the interest in punishing those who escape with 
sanctions keyed to the sentence they were serving when they escaped); Estella Baker & 
Andrew Ashworth, The Role of Previous Convictions in England and Wales, in Roberts & 
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repeat-offender provisions have had only weak success, if any, in 
deterring crime.80  Such laws appear to be associated with a small 
decrease in robbery, burglary, car theft, and larceny consistent across 
multiple states but have had no detectable impact at all on crime in 
some states, such as California, where they have been used most 
aggressively.81  As one scholar put it in a recent review, the results of 
attempts to test the individual deterrent effects of incarceration are 
“rather bleak; the majority of studies have found that incarceration has 
either no effect or undesirable effects on subsequent offending,” 
 
von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 185 (noting that the public believes punishment has greater 
deterrent value than is supported by research); PRATT, supra note 7, at 10 (describing a late 
nineteenth century justification, “[F]or those that repeated their crimes, additional quantities 
of it would be necessary to act as a deterrent where lesser amounts had hitherto proved to be 
ineffective”). 
80. Lila Kazemian, Assessing the Impact of a Recidivist Sentencing Premium on Crime 
and Recidivism Rates, in Roberts & von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 227, 242–44 (collecting 
studies and noting that “[v]arious studies have demonstrated the negligible (or even 
detrimental) effects of three-strikes laws on crime rates, despite substantial increase in costs” 
(citations omitted)); Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can We Return to Rationality?, 87 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 395, 446 (1997) (finding that California’s three strikes law did not 
appear to affect the juvenile crime rate); Tonry, supra note 68, at 39 (collecting authority and 
noting that “[m]ost credible empirical assessments of California’s three-strikes law’s effects 
on crime rates and patterns have concluded that none can be shown,” except a few—using the 
methodology Tonry critiques—that found a small effect). 
 Incarceration generally has been shown to have little effect on crime rates although the 
studies are conflicting.  Compare ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 33 (noting studies that find little 
relationship between punishment severity and aggregate crime rates), and Tonry, supra note 
68, at 36–39 (arguing that government reviews and scholarship have rebutted claims of 
general deterrence, including Pratt et al.’s 2006 finding of no significant effects and Durlauf 
and Nagin’s 2011 finding that at best there is only a modest deterrent effect from increases in 
severity of punishment and that effects of imprisonment “might on average be criminogenic 
rather than crime-preventative” (citing Travis C. Pratt et al., The Empirical Status of 
Deterrence Theory: A Meta-Analysis, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL 
THEORY 367, 379 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2006); Steven N. Durlauf & Daniel S. Nagin, 
Imprisonment and Crime: Can Both Be Reduced?, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 13, 31 
(2011))), and MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2) cmt. e, at 34 (Tentative Draft No. 
1 2007) (“The feasibility of general deterrence through marginal increases in the severity of 
criminal punishments is in doubt, at least for many species of criminal behavior.”), with 
Kazemian, supra, at 238–40 (collecting studies finding some short-term decreases in aggregate 
crime rates following increased incarceration rates). 
81. ZIMRING ET AL., supra note 69, at 93–105 (finding only weak evidence of marginal 
deterrence on third strikers and no hint of any decline on second strikers); Chen, supra note 
68, at 362–63 (finding laws associated with “accelerated rates of decline for robbery, burglary, 
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft” in conjunction with data on the relatively few inmates 
incarcerated under three strikes policies in most states, suggesting that any crime reduction 
associated with the presence of three strikes laws outside California should probably be 
attributed to deterrence effects rather than incarceration effects, and concluding that 
narrowly constructed and seldom-used laws may be as effective as broader laws).  
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although she did note that the limitations of existing research are too 
substantial to draw firm conclusions.82   
One drawback of this research, for example, is the difficulty of 
accounting for variables that have been shown to influence recidivism 
rates, such as the type and quality of supervision after release and other 
correctional policies and practices that continue to change and evolve.83  
As another researcher concluded: “The causes and correlates of rises 
and declines in crime rates are numerous, diverse, and 
elusive . . . .  [P]olicy makers must keep in mind that even major changes 
in sentencing policy may result in only modest impacts on crime rates.”84  
Additional explanations offered by researchers for the failure of repeat-
offender sentences to reduce crime include: the general lack of 
knowledge about sentencing law;85 the criminogenic effects of prison 
terms;86 population constraints that require the release of inmates who 
are more likely to recidivate in order to make room for three strikers 
who are nonviolent or already in the process of “aging out” of crime;87 
and incarceration’s tendency to increase other risk factors for crime such 
as social disorder and the dissolution of families.88 
B. Incapacitating the Dangerous: Predicting Risk from Criminal History 
A second more commonly voiced rationale for recidivist penalties is 
the incapacitation of those most likely to commit future crime.  It is this 
theory that has most consistently motivated increased punishment for 
repeat criminals in earlier eras, as lawmakers have attempted to lock up 
 
82. Kazemian, supra note 80, at 240, 242. 
83. E.g., Michael Ostermann, Recidivism and the Propensity to Forgo Parole Release, 29 
JUST. Q. 596, 596–97 (2012); James A. Wilson, Bad Behavior or Bad Policy? An Examination 
of Tennessee Release Cohorts, 1993–2001, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 485, 485–86 (2005).  
84. Chen, supra note 68, at 363. 
85. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 32 (noting “low rates of awareness of sentencing 
provisions, even for common or well-publicized offenses such as dr[unk] driving”). 
86. Kazemian, supra note 80, at 239. 
87. Chen, supra note 68, at 360; Kazemian, supra note 80, at 243. 
88. Kazemian, supra note 80, at 239; see also RICHARD S. FRASE, JUST SENTENCING: 
PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES FOR A WORKABLE SYSTEM 189 (2013) (citing Kazemian, 
supra note 80; Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Processes of Redemption Should be 
Built into the Use of Criminal-History Records for Background Checking, in 
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY: POLICY PROPOSALS FROM THE 
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF CRIMINOLOGY CONFERENCE 37 (Natasha A. Frost et al. eds., 2010) 
(noting that existing criminal history formulas are likely “overpredicting offender risk by 
failing to account for such factors as nonrecency, aging effects, other changes in the offender’s 
circumstances, substantial periods of desistance, and trends toward desistance”). 
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those perceived to be dangerous recidivists.89  Parole authorities have for 
many decades used risk assessment and predictions of dangerousness to 
decide when to release an offender on parole and to select conditions of 
release.  Only recently have these so-called evidence-based methods 
been embraced by judges and legislators as tools for initial sentencing.  
Supporters of “smart,” or evidence-based sentencing, hope that 
calibrating sentences based upon risk will allow states to trim prison 
populations while getting the most bang for their criminal justice buck.90  
In some jurisdictions, risk scores are formally incorporated into 
sentencing statutes or guidelines.91  In Virginia, risk scores determine 
who is eligible for alternative punishment.92  In Missouri, judges rely on 
an automated recommendation reporting the offender’s risk score and 
predicted recidivism after two years for offenders in his specific risk 
category.93  Kentucky and Indiana include risk assessments in 
 
89. See supra notes 31–34, 43–49 and accompanying text; see also MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING § 6B.09 discussion at 24–25 (Discussion Draft No. 3, 2010) (“Recidivism 
risk . . . is the primary utilitarian justification for the heavy emphasis usually placed on 
criminal history as a sentencing factor.”); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 15.  
90. COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR., LESSONS FROM THE STATES: 
REDUCING RECIDIVISM AND CURBING CORRECTIONS COSTS THROUGH JUSTICE 
REINVESTMENT 4 (2013) (noting that “many states fail to focus their incarceration . . . on the 
people most likely to commit future crimes” and advocate for the use of risk assessment 
instruments); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 21 (noting that “risk is privileged above other 
considerations at sentencing”); Kelly Hannah-Moffat, Actuarial Sentencing: An “Unsettled” 
Proposition, 30 JUST. Q. 270, 271 (2013) (noting a similar trend). 
91. Guidelines incorporating higher penalties for prior offenders are sometimes at least 
initially based on risk assessment instruments.  See, e.g., Daniel A. Krauss, Evaluating Science 
Outside the Trial Box: Applying Daubert to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines’ Criminal 
History Score, 29 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 289 (2006); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 
MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE FEDERAL 
GUIDELINES—A COMPONENT OF THE FIFTEEN YEAR REPORT ON THE U.S. SENTENCING 
COMMISSION’S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE 1 (2004) [hereinafter MEASURING RECIDIVISM]; 
Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy 
Issues, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190, 1201 (2005). 
92. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note d at 52 (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2011); BRIAN J. OSTROM ET AL., THE NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS & THE VA. 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMM’N, OFFENDER RISK ASSESSMENT IN VIRGINIA: A THREE-
STAGE EVALUATION 48 (2002); Brian Netter, Using Group Statistics to Sentence Individual 
Criminals: An Ethical and Statistical Critique of the Virginia Risk Assessment Program, 97 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 699, 699 (2007). 
93. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note i at 61 (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2011); Michael A. Wolff, Evidence-Based Judicial Discretion: Promoting Public Safety 
Through State Sentencing Reform, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1389, 1404 (2008); Michael A. Wolff, 
Missouri Provides Cost of Sentences and Recidivism Data: What Does Cost Have to Do with 
Justice?, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 161, 162 (2012). 
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presentence reports.94  Risk assessment, one scholar noted, “is 
transforming the way that sentencing judges do business.”95  As an 
indication of how controversial this is, the leading legal periodical on 
sentencing, the Federal Sentencing Reporter, recently devoted an entire 
issue to it.96  Risk assessment at sentencing also triggered a major debate 
in the American Law Institute, resulting in a provision that endorses its 
limited use.97 
Many understandably object to the use of risk prediction in 
sentencing as unfair: it punishes a defendant more severely just because 
he has the same characteristics as other people who reoffended after 
release, and it deprives him of liberty for what he might do rather than 
what he actually did.98  Although an offender’s criminal history plays a 
prominent role in risk assessment, some critics of risk assessment are 
most concerned about its reliance upon factors other than prior criminal 
 
94. See Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564, 566 (Ind. 2010); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-
Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014); see also Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 272 (noting use of the risk 
assessment in Pennsylvania). 
95. J.C. Oleson, Risk in Sentencing: Constitutionally Suspect Variables and Evidence-
Based Sentencing, 64 SMU L. REV. 1329, 1394 (2011); see also Discussion of Model Penal 
Code: Sentencing, 88 A.L.I. PROC. 123, 133 (2011) (“[T]he use of risk to lengthen sentences is 
the dominant practice in the United States today.” (statement of Professor Kevin Reitz)). 
96. Risk Assessment: Methodologies and Application, 16 FED. SENT’G REP. 161 (2004); 
see also Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 271 (“There is a lack of consensus about the 
suitability, use, and actual role played by actuarial instruments [generally] in sentencing.”). 
97. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09, at 52–53 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2011); id. app. B at 131; MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 discussion at 26 
(Discussion Draft 2010) (“Should research-based risk and needs assessment be incorporated 
into sentencing guidelines and made an explicit part of the judicial sentencing process?  Is the 
MPCS draft correct to encourage the use of actuarial risk assessment at sentencing as a 
prison-diversion tool, while hesitating to endorse a similar use of risk assessment as a basis for 
enhanced penalties?”); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING app. A at 341 (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 2007) (Black-Letter Provisions Amended to Establish a System of Advisory Sentencing 
Guidelines); id. § 6B.07 cmt. b at 233–34 (“There is controversy within the research 
community about the degree of predictive power of criminal history standing in isolation, and 
reason to believe that predictive accuracy varies with circumstances.  There are also concerns 
that sentencing schemes that place heavy weight on prior offending exacerbate punishment 
disparities affecting racial and ethnic minority groups.  Given that current knowledge on 
these important subjects is far from adequate, § 6B.07 leaves open the possibility that, for 
some, many, or all offenses, commissions of the future might decide the consideration of 
criminal history should be eliminated or given muted effect.”). 
98. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 32; see also, e.g., Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 278 
(noting that “[i]nstead of understanding that an individual with a high risk score shares 
characteristics with an aggregate group of high-risk offenders, practitioners are likely to 
perceive the individual as a high risk offender,” that the person “poses a greater danger to 
society and sentencing him/her accordingly”); Tonry, supra note 2, at 6 n.7. 
KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:15 PM 
542 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:3 
history, such as gender99 or age, over which the offender has no 
control.100  Reliance upon such factors, they argue, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause.101  But a growing chorus is warning that even the use 
of criminal history to predict recidivism risk is unjustified, or 
counterproductive.  Two of the main criticisms critique the reliability of 
predictions of recidivism based on past offending and the corrosive 
racial effects of escalating punishment for those with prior convictions. 
1. Concerns About the Reliability of Risk Predictions Based upon 
Criminal History 
First, even though the best risk-prediction assessments are better 
than expert judgment and can correctly predict the risk class of an 
offender as often as seven out of ten times,102 sentencing based on 
criminal history as practiced is not risk assessment at its best.  
Continuing research, testing whether criminal history predicts future 
criminality, does support a relationship between past and future 
 
99. E.g., Tonry, supra note 2 (noting explicit use of gender under Virginia guidelines).  
Research shows that women are less likely to recidivate.  See MODEL PENAL CODE § 6B.09 
reporter’s note i at 61 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (collecting studies); MEASURING 
RECIDIVISM, supra note 91, at 11 (reporting the results of a study that found that women 
recidivate at a lower rate than men, with a rate of 24.3% for men and 13.7% for women); 
PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 7 (2002).  
100. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PROVING THE UNPROVABLE: THE ROLE OF LAW, 
SCIENCE, AND SPECULATION IN ADJUDICATING CULPABILITY AND DANGEROUSNESS 113–
14 (2007) (collecting criticism of the use of factors over which an individual has little or no 
control).  See generally Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90 (criticizing the use and reliance on non-
criminal history factors in sentencing). 
101. See Christopher Slobogin, Risk Assessment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra note 1, at 196, 209 (noting the Council of Europe’s 
proposal to prohibit risk assessments other than in past crimes); Starr, supra note 94. 
102. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note e at 60 (Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011) (“The better risk scales can yield correct classifications, measured against 
actual recidivism data, in up to 70 percent of all cases . . . .”) (collecting authority); Paul 
Gendreau et al., A Meta-Analysis of the Predictors of Adult Offender Recidivism: What 
Works!, 34 CRIMINOLOGY 575, 588 (1996); Joan Petersilia & Susan Turner, Guideline-Based 
Justice: Prediction and Racial Minorities, 9 CRIME & JUST. 151, 174 (1987) (noting that the 
predictive power of risk assessment instruments is at best sixty to seventy percent accurate); 
Slobogin, supra note 101, at 209.  
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offending.103  But the research also raises concerns about the reliability 
of predicting recidivism based on criminal history.104 
Much of the research supporting the reliability of risk prediction 
instruments has tested instruments that were developed to predict 
recidivism by parolees and to select conditions of release.  These 
instruments include variables such as age, gender, and type of offense, as 
well as “dynamic” factors that change after sentencing, such as 
treatment for substance abuse or mental health issues, physical health, 
job training, education, marital status, and social support.105  Predicting 
risk based on prior criminal history alone omits all of these factors, 
increasing the number of cases for which the prediction is wrong.106  
There may be good reasons for omitting all factors other than criminal 
history from risk assessments at sentencing.  However, when the only 
 
103. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 reporter’s note a at 58–59 (Tentative 
Draft No. 2, 2011); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 22 (noting that predictions of future felony 
offending are more reliable when multiple previous convictions are taken into account than 
when they are not); Petersilia & Turner, supra note 102, at 166 n.8 (“Prior record has 
consistently been shown to be the best predictor of future criminality.”). 
104. Professor Kevin Reitz, Reporter for the MPC Sentencing Project, recently 
suggested that even if risk assessment as applied is more reliable than trained professional 
judgment, the false positive rate may be so high that basing the duration of a prison term on 
risk prediction may not be defensible.  Kevin R. Reitz, The “Traditional” Indeterminate 
Sentencing Model, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, supra 
note 1, at 270, 280–81 (discussing instruments used for parole release); see also MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 cmt. e at 56 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (warning of 
“notoriously high” error rates in predictions of future criminal behavior). 
105. Paul Gendreau et al., supra note 102, at 588 (noting “variables such as age, criminal 
history, companions, family factors, gender, social achievement, and substance abuse are 
significant and potent predictors of recidivism”); John Monahan, A Jurisprudence of Risk 
Assessment: Forecasting Harm Among Prisoners, Predators, and Patients, 92 VA. L. REV. 391, 
413–23 (2006). 
106. SLOBOGIN, supra note 100, at 105–06; Netter, supra note 92, at 712 (noting a study 
that finds VCSC error rates and criticizing methodology); OSTROM ET AL., supra note 92, at 
48 (observing that many assessment instruments actually used at sentencing omit age, gender, 
employment, and marital status); Petersilia & Turner, supra note 102, at 167 (omitting factors 
that are correlated with race from a model to predict recidivism reduced the accuracy of the 
model by five to twelve percentage points); Slobogin, supra note 101, at 208–09, 283–84 
(eliminating problematic variables and those associated with protected categories (i.e., race 
and gender) reduces predictive power and also noting that some studies may not include 
enough factors because samples are too small); Wilson, supra note 82, at 507–11 (noting post-
release variables that influence recidivism, such as a jurisdiction’s policy on when violations 
require reincarceration, when violations are charged, and rehab/reentry policies).  But see 
Jennifer Skeem, Risk Technology in Sentencing: Testing the Promises and Perils (Commentary 
on Hannah-Moffat, 2011), 30 JUST. Q. 297, 300 (2013); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
app. B at 131 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011)  (arguing that “the predictive value of the so-
called dynamic factors has yet to be demonstrated empirically”); Starr, supra note 94. 
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basis for a prediction is criminal history, it is misleading to equate its 
accuracy with that of the best risk assessment instruments. 
Also, although research confirms that recidivism rates do increase as 
the number of prior convictions increases beyond three or four, the 
relationship between a single prior conviction and future crime is much 
more tenuous.107  For example, two years after release from their first 
conviction, offenders aged forty-two or older are no more likely to 
commit a crime than people with clean records; for those between 
thirty-seven and forty-one years old, the rates converge after five 
years.108  So maybe the old adage “Once a criminal, always a criminal” 
might make sense if it was “Four times a criminal recently, probably a 
criminal later,” but to assume that a single criminal conviction dooms a 
person to a life of crime may be no more accurate than nineteenth 
century attempts to predict future criminal behavior from jaw size. 
The research confirming the relationship between past offending and 
recidivism also does not use a consistent measure of recidivism.  
Measures include any subsequent violent crime, felony arrest, felony 
conviction, conviction for any crime including a misdemeanor, or 
violation of a condition of supervised release.109  A risk assessment 
instrument generally reliable in predicting re-imprisonment for any 
reason may not be a reliable method of forecasting the likelihood of 
future violent behavior.110 
 
107. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 30–32 (“[R]esearch suggests that the relationship 
between the number and nature of previous convictions and the likelihood of reoffending is 
complex and attenuates more rapidly than is commonly believed.”); Shawn D. Bushway et al., 
The Predictive Value of Criminal Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect 
Time to Redemption?, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 50–52 (2011) (finding a significant relationship 
between the number of prior offenses and the likelihood of re-offending).   
108. Bushway et al., supra note 107, at 51. 
109. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 277; JOAN PETERSILIA, CAL. POLICY RESEARCH 
CTR., UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 73–74 (2006); see also MEASURING 
RECIDIVISM, supra note 91, at 7 (“Supervision violations are the largest type of recidivism 
behavior, accounting for an average 45 percent of recidivism across the CHCs.”); SLOBOGIN, 
supra note 100, at 112 (stating that validation may count a minor assault as well as a more 
serious crime); Slobogin, supra note 101, at 208 (noting that validation sometimes uses only 
violation acts). 
110. Other variation between research and applied risk prediction includes the use of 
instruments validated for one population on a different population where the reliability of 
predictions are either not tested or not accurate.  See SLOBOGIN, supra note 100, at 111; 
Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 280 (discussing how existing instruments based on males 
are not applicable to women); Slobogin, supra note 101, at 208.  Krauss notes that the very 
limited efforts to test the predictive accuracy of the CHS in USSG suffer from great variation 
based on the cohort of the population studied and that subjects studied differed from those 
actually sentenced.  Krauss, supra note 91, at 300.  Several sources, including James Bonta et 
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Repeat-offender laws and criminal history scores also do not 
necessarily track the measures of past offending that research links to 
recidivism.  Juvenile history is often included,111 despite research 
showing that most people desist from crime after late adolescence and 
questioning the predictive value of juvenile offenses.112  Depending upon 
the age of an offender, the recency of a prior conviction may 
dramatically impact its predictive capacity,113 yet criminal history 
provisions typically do not vary with the age of the defendant, nor do 
they always exclude prior convictions from decades earlier.114  Arrests, 
convictions, and sentence length are all used for assessing criminal 
history, but each may carry a different predictive power.115  The type of 
prior crime also matters.  For example, property offenses are much 
 
al., The Dangerous Offender Provisions: Are They Targeting the Right Offenders?, 40 CAN. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 377, 377 (1998), observe that instruments for nonsexual offenders do not do 
well at predicting re-offending by sex offenders.  See Markus Dirk Dubber, Note, The 
Unprincipled Punishment of Repeat Offenders: A Critique of California’s Habitual Criminal 
Statute, 43 STAN. L. REV. 193, 236 (1990) (calling this defect in California’s law “scientifically 
and morally suspect”).  
111. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(3) (West 2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 12.42(f) (West Supp. 2013); see also Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class 
Punishment: The Use of Juvenile Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206, 206 
(1998). 
112. Reitz, supra note 104, at 280 (discussing instruments used for parole release: “Some 
states include arrests in the mix, while most register only convictions or past incarcerations, 
and there are sharp difference of opinion on the use of juvenile records”); Elizabeth S. Scott 
& Thomas Grisso, The Evolution of Adolescence: A Developmental Perspective on Juvenile 
Justice Reform, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 137, 154 (1997); BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY AND JUVENILE JUSTICE RECORDS: A MID-
DECADE STATUS REPORT 2 (1997) (while “[t]he vast majority of juveniles desist from 
crime, . . . a small minority engag[e] in chronic and serious recidivistic behavior”). 
113. Bushway et al., supra note 107, at 50–52; Tonry, supra note 68, at 42–43 (arguing 
that confining people for property and violent offenses after they would have desisted from 
crime in late teens and early twenties is inefficient and may be criminogenic; even active 
career offenders end their careers in their thirties). 
114. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(c) (West 2012); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21–4710(d)(3)–
(8) (2006) (providing some juvenile adjudications decay, but no decay period for adult 
convictions); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A–1340.14 (2011); 204 PA. CONS. STAT. § 303.6(c) (2005) 
(limitations period only for juvenile history); MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.09 
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011); Dubber, supra note 110, at 208 (noting that under California’s 
section 667 “a 30-year-old conviction carries the same weight as a 3-month-old conviction”); 
Julian V. Roberts, The Role of Criminal Record in the Sentencing Process, 22 CRIME & JUST. 
303, 356 (1997) (“most systems simply count all convictions within a ten- or fifteen-year 
period,” trading ease of application for a loss of discrimination between offenders of variable 
recidivism risk).  
115. On the debate about whether to use arrests or noncharged conduct in criminal 
history, see Tonry, supra note 2.   
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more likely to be repeated than other offenses.116  But sentencing laws 
and rules and guidelines often do not distinguish between types of 
felonies.  One set of guidelines equates those who solicit prostitution 
with those convicted of robbery or manslaughter.117  Some provisions 
raise penalties for those with past misdemeanors and even deferred 
adjudications.118  These various problems suggest that although 
sophisticated risk assessment instruments may generate predictions of 
recidivism that are right more often than they are wrong, there is little 
reason to expect that estimates based on prior convictions alone would 
be as accurate. 
2. Costs of Increasing Sentences Based on Predictions from Criminal 
History: Exacerbating Racial Bias 
A second problem is that even if using criminal history does help 
somewhat in predicting recidivism, any resulting marginal reduction in 
crime may not be worth its costs.  Recent research has shown that 
reliance on criminal history exacerbates past racial bias in investigation, 
arrest, prosecution, and sentencing.119  Bernard Harcourt in his book 
 
116. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 15; EDWARD ZAMBLE & VERNON L. QUINSEY, THE 
CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM PROCESS 96 (1997) (showing those whose new convictions involved 
only property had longer but less violent criminal histories); OSTROM ET AL., supra note 92, 
at 79; Tonry, supra note 2, at 4 (noting that one of the changes to the well-known risk 
assessment instruments on which the USSG CHS score is based that has increased the rates of 
false positives was removing factors that had successfully identified those less serious crimes 
most likely to be repeated, such as auto theft and check fraud). 
117. Michael Tonry, Proportionality, Parsimony, and Interchangeability of Punishments, 
in WHY PUNISH? HOW MUCH? A READER ON PUNISHMENT 217, 227 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2011); see also BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, 
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 100 (2007) (noting that focus is on the number of 
priors with little distinction made between the types of offenders). 
118. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (some misdemeanors); United States v. Morillo, 
178 F.3d 18, 18, 21 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that a “continuance without finding” disposition 
under Mass. Gen. Law, Ch. 278, § 18, counts as a prior sentence for federal sentencing 
purposes because it is an admission of guilt); Rudman v. Leavitt, 578 F. Supp. 2d 812, 815 (D. 
Md. 2008) (holding that probation before judgment under Maryland law is considered a prior 
conviction for purposes of federal sentencing).  But see MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING 
§ 6.02B(9) (Discussion Draft No. 4, 2012) (arguing that a deferred adjudication may not be 
considered a part of the accused’s criminal history in later proceedings). 
119. Tonry, supra note 1, at 77 (“Because black offenders are arrested more often and at 
younger ages than whites, they are more often affected by prior record increments.”); 
ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 7; Alfred Blumstein & Jacqueline Cohen, Characterizing Criminal 
Careers, 237 SCI. 985, 990 (“[R]acial discrimination in arrest, sentencing, or parole decisions, 
which is unambiguously prohibited on normative grounds, is also empirically wrong as a basis 
for decisions about active offenders.”); Tonry, supra note 2.  But compare Skeem, supra note 
106, at 301 (arguing that criminal history does not raise the same race effects as other factors), 
with Oleson, supra note 95, at 1396. 
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Against Prediction calls this the “ratchet effect” and condemns risk 
prediction at all phases of the criminal justice process for this reason.120  
Nearly one in three adults in this country has a criminal history record,121 
and as of 2007, the percentage of blacks under correctional control in 
the United States was more than four times that of whites.122  Professor 
Richard Frase found that in Minnesota two-thirds of racial disparities in 
imprisonment rates resulted from the weighting of criminal history 
factors in sentencing.123  Since California adopted its three strikes law, 
black defendants have received significantly longer prison sentences 
than whites and Latinos.124  Just a few months ago, a bill to loosen 
criminal history requirements for exempting federal drug offenders from 
mandatory minimums was introduced in Congress, and U.S. Attorney 
General Eric Holder ordered federal prosecutors to consider ignoring 
recidivism provisions, stating: “In some cases . . . recidivist enhancement 
statutes have resulted in unduly harsh sentences and perceived or actual 
disparities that do not reflect our Principles of Federal Prosecution.”125  
 
120. HARCOURT, supra note 117, at 147. 
121. See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC ENFORCEMENT 
GUIDANCE 27 n.4 (2012), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_convi
ction.pdf [hereinafter EEOC] (citing Robert Brame et al., Cumulative Prevalence of Arrest 
From Ages 8 to 23 in a National Sample, 129 PEDIATRICS 21, 25–26 (2012)). 
122. Id. at 37 n.74 (citing PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG REACH OF 
AMERICAN CORRECTIONS 4, at 5 (2009), available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/u
ploadedFiles/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3-26-09.pdf); WILLIAM J. SABOL ET AL., 
BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRISONERS IN 2006, at 8 (2007). 
123. FRASE, supra note 88, at 216; Jamie Fellner, Race and Drugs, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF ETHNICITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION (Sandra M. Bucerius & Michael 
Tonry eds.) (2013), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/Race%
20and%20Drugs.pdf  (concluding that any use of recidivist enhancements increased racial 
disparity, but using arrest data in particular creates greater disparity than using past 
sentences); see also Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 277, 279, 282; Cassia Spohn et al., The 
Effect of Prior Record in Sentencing Research: An Examination of the Assumption that Any 
Measure Is Adequate, 4 JUST. Q. 287, 289 (1987) (“[M]easures of incarceration had the most 
uniform effects on the sentences of both blacks and whites, while other measures had 
opposite effects for blacks and for whites or had no strong positive associations with sentence 
severity.”); JOHN PAWASARAT & LOIS M. QUINN, WISCONSIN’S MASS INCARCERATION OF 
AFRICAN AMERICAN MALES: WORKFORCE CHALLENGES FOR 2013, at 15 (2013) (“The 
incarceration levels [for black men from Milwaukee County] in the 2003–2008 period are 
nearly four times those seen in 1990 before drug law changes, truth-in-sentencing, mandatory 
sentences, and three-strikes laws were broadly imposed.”). 
124. SCOTT EHLERS ET AL., RACIAL DIVIDE: AN EXAMINATION OF THE IMPACT OF 
CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES LAW ON AFRICAN AMERICANS AND LATINOS 2 (2004). 
125. Memorandum from the Attorney Gen. to the U.S. Attorneys and Assistant 
Attorney Gen. for the Criminal Div. 1, 3 (Aug. 12, 2013) (noting that a Prior Felony 
Information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 should not be filed “unless the defendant is involved 
in conduct that makes the case appropriate for severe sanctions”). 
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This problem is so pronounced that the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission recently warned employers that using criminal 
history data in hiring decisions could expose them to disparate impact 
lawsuits.126   
C. Just Deserts in Proportion to Blame: A Mismatch with Repeat-
Offender Penalties 
For these reasons and more, many retributivists would forbid any 
consideration of criminal history in setting sentences.  Prior acts, they 
argue, are unrelated to the only thing that matters in sentencing: the 
blameworthiness of the offender for the offense of conviction.  Some 
retribution purists would abandon consideration of criminal history as 
entirely inconsistent with these principles.127  Others committed to the 
sentencing philosophy of “just deserts” have argued that repeat 
offenders are actually more blameworthy because they are more defiant 
and incorrigible,128 or because they had already learned that their 
behavior was wrong.129 
Too often current laws fail to advance either theory.  To indicate 
defiance, an additional crime would require willful law breaking, but of 
course a defendant may be convicted even if he believes he is complying 
 
126. See EEOC, supra note 121; see also John F. Pfaff, Waylaid by A Metaphor: A 
Deeply Problematic Account of Prison Growth, 111 MICH. L. REV. 1087, 1097 (2013) (noting 
that although relatively few drug arrests result in incarceration, when later arrested for a 
nondrug offense prior drug convictions may lead to a longer sentence, or to incarceration 
rather than probation, and suggesting “it may be more productive for reformers [interested in 
reducing prison populations] to focus on changing repeat-offender laws, not drug-sentencing 
laws”). 
127. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6B.07 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007); 
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 466 (2000) (noting that there are 
“serious ethical issues in punishing a person more severely on the basis of past crimes already 
once punished”); HARCOURT, supra note 117, at 238; ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR 
FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF 
CRIMINALS 77–91 (1987) (arguing that only a modest increment of additional punishment for 
prior offenses is permissible in just-deserts theory); ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 9 (collecting 
proponents of what he calls “flat rate” sentencing, based only on crime of conviction and not 
varying with the character of the defendant); RICHARD G. SINGER, JUST DESERTS: 
SENTENCING BASED ON EQUALITY AND DESERT 67–73 (1979); Stephen J. Morse, Preventive 
Confinement of Dangerous Offenders, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 56, 66 (2004). 
128. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 37; Markus Dirk Dubber, Recidivist Statutes as Arational 
Punishment, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 689, 705 (1995) (terming this theory a “penalty for 
recalcitrance” or “insufficient obsequiousness” unrelated to “moral desert”); Paul H. 
Robinson, Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 287, 313 
(2001). 
129. ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 88. 
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with the law.130  Both of these theories of increased culpability also 
would logically exclude offenses that involve less than knowing 
behavior, yet repeat-offender premiums are imposed for negligent, 
impulsive, and reckless action too.131  Nor are increased sentences 
conditioned upon a finding that the defendant committed the same 
offense again.132  
Most importantly, for higher penalties to make sense for repeat 
offenders under either of these greater-culpability theories, the latest 
offense must have been committed after conviction and punishment for 
the earlier offense.  Many repeat-offender provisions punish defendants 
who have “prior” convictions not because their latest criminal acts were 
committed after a previous sentence but only because prosecutors 
decided to prosecute sequentially multiple counts arising from a single 
incident.133  Some statutes explicitly authorize repeat-offender penalties 
for defendants convicted of multiple offenses committed at the same 
time or even for defendants whose prior conviction was for an offense 
that was committed after the charged offense.134  In sum, legislatures, 
commissions, and courts could do a better job of matching actual repeat-
offender punishments with both theory and research. 
 
130. Id. at 42. 
131. Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality and Progressive Loss of Mitigation: Further 
Reflections, in Roberts & von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 1, 5 (“[A] mark of much recidivism 
(especially repeat-minor offending) is impulsiveness.”); Michael Tonry, The Questionable 
Relevance of Previous Convictions to Punishments for Later Crimes, in Roberts & von Hirsch, 
supra note 2, at 91. 
132. Youngjae Lee, Repeat Offenders and the Question of Desert, in Roberts & von 
Hirsch, supra note 2, at 49, 56. 
133. Caldwell, supra note 4, at 589–90; Dubber, supra note 110, at 228–29 (criticizing this 
aspect of California’s law); see also Reitz, supra note 2, at 143–48 (discussing the difficulty of 
reconciling the recidivist premium with the bulk discount). 
134. FRASE, supra note 88, at 178–79; Richard S. Frase, Prior-Conviction Sentencing 
Enhancements: Rationales and Limits Based on Retributive and Utilitarian Proportionality 
Principles and Social Equality Goals, in Roberts & von Hirsch, supra note 2, at 117, 117–19; 
Kenneth G. Schuler, Note, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple 
Punishment Doctrine, 91 MICH. L. REV. 2220, 2228–29 nn.59–60 (1993); see also Deal v. 
United States, 508 U.S. 129, 135 (1993) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) to require only a 
jury finding of guilt for conviction and not that an offender commit an additional crime after 
another conviction); Commonwealth v. Gehris, 54 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. 2012) (reviewing 
authority and interpreting statute to bar second-offender sentence when that sentence is 
based on other counts in a multiple-count complaint); Commonwealth v. Jarowecki, 985 A.2d 
955, 968–69 (Pa. 2009) (same); Brief for Defendant-Appellant at 37, United States v. Clark, 
No. 12-30377 (9th Cir. Aug. 22, 2013).  See generally Cynthia L. Sletto, Annotation, 
Chronological or Procedural Sequence of Former Convictions as Affecting Enhancement of 
Penalty Under Habitual Offender Statutes, 7 A.L.R.5th 263 (1992). 
KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:15 PM 
550 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:3 
IV. THE PROCESS FOR CHARGING AND PROVING PRIOR CONVICTIONS 
THAT RAISE SENTENCE RANGES: A CHANGING CONSTITUTIONAL 
LANDSCAPE 
A separate controversy is whether the process for imposing these 
penalties violates the Constitution.  Specifically, when a statute 
increases the range of punishment for prior offenders above that 
available for first offenders, lower courts have relied upon Supreme 
Court precedent in holding that the prior conviction may be treated as a 
sentencing factor, determined only after conviction, with no formal 
notice, by a judge who finds it more likely than not.  But this should, and 
likely will, change.  There is no adequate justification for denying the 
accused his right to notice and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a 
jury of the fact of prior conviction if that fact raises the range of 
punishment he faces.  In other words, a prior conviction that aggravates 
the range of punishment must, like any other fact with this effect, be 
treated as an element of what is essentially a greater offense.  This Part 
examines the origins, purported justifications, and probable demise of 
the rule that allows courts to treat prior convictions differently than any 
other fact triggering increased punishment. 
A. Apprendi v. New Jersey, Alleyne v. United States, and the Exception 
for Prior Convictions 
In the summer of 2000, the Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New 
Jersey135 held that a fact that increases the maximum penalty a defendant 
faces for a crime is an element of that crime, and a defendant has a right 
to have a jury find that fact beyond a reasonable doubt.  A sentence 
longer than what is authorized for the offense of conviction, based on a 
judge’s determination that a fact is probably true, violates the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury finding of every element, said the Supreme 
Court.  This past summer, in Alleyne v. United States,136 the Court 
overruled a 2002 decision in which it had refused to extend Apprendi’s 
principle to facts that increase only the minimum sentence.  Element 
status for facts raising a sentencing range brings with it at least three 
rights: the right to jury determination, the right to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and, at least in the federal courts, the right to 
inclusion of the allegation in the indictment.137 
 
135. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
136. 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). 
137. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002) (“In Apprendi, we held that 
‘[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:15 PM 
2014] SENTENCING AND PRIOR CONVICTIONS 551 
But in every one of its many decisions applying Apprendi, the Court 
has carefully stepped around statutes that raise punishment ranges for 
prior offenders.  It has done this by consistently including in each 
declaration of the Apprendi rule an exemption for the particular fact of 
prior conviction.138  Yet none of the many cases stating the Apprendi rule 
have actually involved a recidivist penalty, so the exception remains 
dicta.  Most recently, the Alleyne decision included a footnote 
explaining that the Court declined to revisit the exception because the 
parties had not contested it.139  Plenty of other defendants are contesting 
 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’  In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the 
indictment.” (internal citations omitted)).  When applying the Apprendi rule in state cases, 
the Court has addressed only jury and burden issues, not charging.  States have divided over 
whether the Sixth Amendment requires such facts to be included in the initial charge.  See 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 5 CRIM. PROC. § 19.3(a), § 26.4(i) n.200.9 (3d ed. 2013) 
(recognizing that most of the more than a dozen decisions addressing this issue have held that 
Apprendi facts are not elements that must be included along with the original charge under 
federal constitutional law, collecting authority, and noting that some argue that the notice 
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is satisfied by notice other than inclusion in the 
charging instrument, while others seem to reject the very premise of the Court’s doctrine, 
reasoning that the different levels of punishment do not create separate offenses and that the 
severity of punishment for a single offense is not an appropriate subject of grand jury review); 
see also MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.07B cmt. c & reporter’s note c at 301, 314 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (noting that “[c]onsistent with all state legislation on the 
subject, § 7.07B does not treat jury-sentencing facts as elements of offenses.  The provision 
does assume, however, that Due Process guarantees in federal and state law will require that 
the defendant receive timely notice of any alleged jury-sentencing fact in the case, and must 
be given adequate opportunity to prepare to challenge the existence of the fact in a jury 
proceeding,” recognizing that “many jurisdictions have adopted procedures outside of the 
charging instrument to ensure that the government gives adequate notice to the defendant 
that a jury-sentencing fact will been raised”) (collecting authority). 
138. See, e.g., Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 281–82 (2007) (“Other than a 
prior conviction, we held in Apprendi, ‘any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt.’” (internal citation omitted)); Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 
563 n.3 (2010) (“[T]he statutory scheme comports with Almendarez-Torres, in which we 
explained that the Constitution does not require treating recidivism as an element of the 
offense.” (internal citations omitted)); United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218, 224, 235 (2010) 
(noting that “one exception has been established” and that “the recidivist provisions in [18 
U.S.C. § 924](C)(i) and (ii) . . . are typically sentencing factors”); James v. United States, 550 
U.S. 192, 214 n.8 (2007) (“To the extent that James contends that the simple fact of his prior 
conviction was required to be found by a jury, his position is baseless.  James admitted the 
fact of his prior conviction in his guilty plea, and in any case, we have held that prior 
convictions need not be treated as an element of the offense for Sixth Amendment 
purposes.”). 
139. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 n.1 (2013) (“Because the parties do 
not contest that decision’s vitality, we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision today.”).  
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it, and a majority of justices may be ready to scrap it.  Here is why they 
should. 
B. No Clear Historical Basis for the Exception 
First, the historical record, so crucial to the Court in all of its 
Apprendi cases, does not support exempting prior convictions from the 
Apprendi rule.  As for charging practice, in the late 1700s, there appear 
to be no decisions departing from the common law rule that required 
the initial charge to allege any prior offense that increased punishment.  
Courts continued to follow the rule throughout the nineteenth century, 
except for a handful of states that opted to permit prior convictions to 
be alleged after conviction of the charged offense if those prior offenses 
had not been alleged in the initial charging instrument and a defendant’s 
first offender status was debunked in prison.140 
Eventually, in 1912 in Graham v. West Virginia,141 the Supreme Court 
addressed this alternative procedure.  After Graham had pleaded guilty 
to larceny and was sentenced to five years in prison, he was charged, in a 
separate information, of having been convicted twice before.  A jury 
found that allegation proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and he was 
resentenced to life in prison.  The Court reasoned that this process was a 
rational approach for the state to adopt in order to deal with those 
recognized as former offenders only after they were admitted to prison142 
and concluded that omitting the prior offense allegation from the initial 
indictment was not a federal constitutional problem, reiterating that 
states need not use indictments at all.143  After Graham, more states 
adopted this approach, some of them placing no time limit on the delay 
in bringing the new allegation and lengthening an offender’s 
incarceration.144  But this departure from the common law rule affected 
 
140. The states departing from the common law rule prior to the Court’s decision in 
Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912), were Massachusetts in 1817, see supra notes 
26–29 and accompanying text; Virginia in 1819; South Carolina in 1832; West Virginia, which 
adopted the Virginia practice when it became its own state in 1860, see Oyler v. Boles, 368 
U.S. 448, 449–50 (1962); and Kansas, which became a state in 1859.  Both Louisiana and 
Maine for a time allowed post-conviction allegations of repeat-offender status, but this 
position was later repudiated by the courts in each state.  For a listing of 19th Century 
authority in each state, see infra Appendix.  
141. 224 U.S. 616 (1912). 
142. Id. at 587. 
143. Id. at 627 (noting that states are free to use information rather than indictment to 
charge offenses and citing Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Brown v. New Jersey, 
175 U.S. 172, 175 (1899); and Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581, 584 (1900)). 
144. See infra Appendix. 
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no more than a handful of states until 1912 and was not followed in the 
federal courts where the Bill of Rights was fully applicable.145  Such a 
limited development is nothing like the established historical practices 
that have influenced the Court in its prior Apprendi decisions. 
As for the right to have a jury decide prior-offense status, that was 
the law in virtually every federal and state jurisdiction, from the 
Founding past World War II.146  As late as 1946, only Alabama and 
Kansas allowed a judge to make this determination instead of a jury.147  
Whenever a defendant pleaded guilty (and even after conviction by jury 
trial in the handful of states where repeat status could be charged after 
conviction), a new jury was empaneled to consider the allegation.  
Otherwise, when the defendant contested the allegation, it was the same 
 
145. Federal courts, testing the application of the federal repeat-offender statutes passed 
as part of Prohibition, consistently treated prior convictions as elements of an aggravated 
offense.  See, e.g., Hefferman v. United States, 50 F.2d 554, 555–57 (3d Cir. 1931); Jacobs v. 
United States, 24 F.2d 890, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1928) (“In a case where a party is proceeded against 
for a second or third offense under the statute, and the sentence prescribed is different from 
the first by reason of its being a second or third offense, the fact thus relied on must be 
averred in the indictment.”); Klein v. United States, 14 F.2d 35, 36–37 (1st Cir. 1926); 
McCarren v. United States, 8 F.2d 113, 114 (7th Cir. 1925) (stating that a prosecutor is 
required to allege in the indictment or information that defendant has previously been 
convicted of a violation of the National Prohibition Act); Massey v. United States, 281 F. 293, 
298 (8th Cir. 1922) (“The accused is entitled to have the exact charge against him stated in the 
indictment or information, and to have the verdict of the jury upon the fact of a prior 
conviction for the same offense, and of his identity with the person so convicted, and it is the 
duty of the government which prosecutes to allege and prove the existence of the prior 
conviction of the accused as a fact that may cause a severer penalty to be imposed.”); Singer 
v. United States, 278 F. 415, 419–20 (3d Cir. 1922) (stating that inclusion in the charge was 
required even if Congress did not so intend); United States v. Noel, 51 F.2d 139, 141 (S.D. 
Ala. 1931) (holding that a district attorney is required to allege a previous conviction); United 
States ex rel. Manchbach v. Moore, 2 F.2d 988, 989 (E.D. N.Y. 1924).  Congress had passed 
one other statute boosting penalties for prior offenders before the National Prohibition Act, a 
1919 statute punishing second offense mail theft, see supra note 59, but no cases could be 
located discussing that particular provision. 
146. As the Court observed in Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 556 (1967), as of 1967, 
“The common-law procedure for applying recidivist statutes, . . . which requires allegations 
and proof of past convictions in the current trial, is, of course, the simplest and best known 
procedure.”  See generally Annotation, Constitutionality and Construction of Statute 
Enhancing Penalty for Second or Subsequent Offense, 58 A.L.R. 20 (1929); Brown, supra note 
52; Harold Dubroff, Note, Recidivist Procedures, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 332 (1965); David S. 
Sidikman, Note, The Pleading and Proof of Prior Convictions in Habitual Criminal 
Prosecutions, 33 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210 (1958). 
147. See Note, Court Treatment of General Recidivist Statutes, 48 COLUM. L. REV. 238, 
241 (1948) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-107(a) (1945)) (stating all but one made it a jury 
question and only Kansas allowed trial to the court); see also infra Alabama and Kansas 
authority listed in Appendix.  By 1968, five additional states had authorized judicial findings.  
See Dubroff, supra note 146, at 347 n.89 (listing statutes from Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, 
Nebraska, and Oregon).  
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jury that decided the other elements of the offense.148  And there is 
evidence that juries sometimes chose to nullify these harsh laws, rather 
than apply them.  Observers reported more than one case in which the 
jury, despite fingerprints and other “unmistakable evidence” that a 
defendant was indeed a multiple offender, “decided upon its oath that 
the prisoner was a first offender.”149 
Finally, whenever a prior conviction would increase the sentence 
beyond that available for a first offender, the jury was instructed that it 
had to find that the government established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the offender was the same person who had been convicted earlier.150  
Justice Cardozo, writing in a 1932 case in which the jury’s consideration 
of the defendant’s prior convictions took place after the filing of a 
supplemental information, explained why: 
The answer made to the “accusation” by the verdict of the jury 
may mean that the defendant will be a free man after a brief 
term of confinement, or may mean, on the other hand, that he 
will be a prisoner for life.  If the previous convictions had been 
charged in an indictment, there is no doubt that they must have 
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, for they would then 
have been elements affecting the grade of the offense.  We find 
no token of a purpose to abate the measure of the proof upon an 
inquiry as to the same elements after guilt has been adjudged.  
The genius of our criminal law is violated when punishment is 
enhanced in the face of a reasonable doubt as to the facts leading 
to enhancement.  If that genius is to be expelled, there should be 
 
148. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 268 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court’s hostility to jury determination of prior convictions is quite simply at odds 
with the manner in which recidivism laws have historically been treated in this country.”).  
Thus, even if the very limited variation in the nineteenth century regarding charging would 
justify some flexibility for prior conviction allegations under the Sixth Amendment’s notice 
requirement, it would not justify similar flexibility for the jury requirement. 
149. THE BAUMES LAW 142–43, 164 (Julia E. Johnson ed., 1929).  Consider also Swann 
v. State, 1 A. 872, 872–73 (Md. 1885) (holding, in a case where proof of second offense was 
clear, that it was error for judge to have responded to jury’s question of whether it could find 
a verdict for a first offense by instructing the jury that it either must acquit or find second 
offense, but harmless). 
150. See Dubroff, supra note 146, at 341–42 (“Where . . . the defendant denies that he 
was the person previously convicted, it is the usual rule that the state must prove identity just 
as it must prove guilt for an ordinary crime.  There is likewise little conflict among the states 
as to the burden of proof the prosecution must sustain, most jurisdictions requiring the 
criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt . . . .” (footnote omitted)); see also 
Spencer, 385 U.S. at 574; M. C. Dransfield, Annotation, Evidence of Identity for Purposes of 
Statute as to Enhanced Punishment in Case of Prior Conviction, 11 A.L.R.2d 870 (1950) 
(collecting cases from federal courts and twenty-five states). 
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a clear announcement of the purpose to drive it forth from the 
dwelling it has inhabited so long.151 
C. Precedent: Why Almendarez-Torres and Other Cases Do Not Support 
the Exception 
So much for history.  Precedent should not prop up this exception 
either.  The case of Almendarez-Torres v. United States152 is considered 
the chief authority for the prior-conviction exception,153 but its basis is 
no longer viable.  The defendant in that case turned up in a Texas jail 
after he had been deported following a burglary conviction and was 
charged with reentering the United States illegally.  His indictment did 
not specify whether he was being charged under subsection (a) of the 
criminal statute that stated that the maximum sentence was two years or 
subsection (b) that provided for up to twenty years if reentry occurred 
after being convicted of an aggravated felony.154  The defendant pleaded 
guilty, admitted his prior burglary conviction,155 but then argued at 
sentencing that because his indictment had not alleged his prior 
conviction, an element of the greater offense defined in subsection (b), 
he faced at most two years.156  The judge disagreed, sentenced him to 
seven years, and the Supreme Court in a five-to-four decision upheld 
that sentence.  Congress intended that the prior conviction that 
triggered the eighteen-year increase would be a sentencing factor that 
the judge could find after conviction, the Court reasoned, not an 
element of a greater offense.  Two years later, when the Court 
announced in Apprendi that legislatures cannot bypass the right to a 
 
151. People v. Reese, 179 N.E. 305, 305–06, 308 (N.Y. 1932) (internal citations omitted). 
152. 523 U.S. 224 (1998). 
153. Indeed, Justice Thomas has written that “the exception to trial by jury for 
establishing ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ finds its basis not in the Constitution, but in a 
precedent of this Court.”  Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200, 1202 (2006) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224), denying cert. to 168 F. 
App’x 616 (5th Cir. 2006).  
154. 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)(2), (b)(2) (2012). 
155. Brief for the United States at 5–6, Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 
224 (1998) (No. 96-6839). 
156. By the time sentencing rolled around, the government and probation officer had 
realized the maximum sentence under subsection (b) was twenty years, not ten, and had 
modified the presentence report to reflect this.  But the defendant objected and argued that 
the maximum he faced was actually two years because he had pleaded guilty to an indictment 
that had charged the offense defined by subsection (a) and had not alleged his prior felony 
conviction, an element of the greater offense defined by subsection (b).  The district court 
disagreed and sentenced him to just over seven years in prison and two years supervised 
release.  Id. at 7. 
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jury trial by designating a fact that raises the maximum sentence as a 
“sentencing factor” instead of an element, it expressly exempted the fact 
of prior conviction, cited its decision in Almendarez-Torres, and the 
“prior-conviction exception” to the Sixth Amendment rule in Apprendi 
was born. 
The Court was wrong to carve out this prior-conviction exception in 
Apprendi, and it was wrong in Almendarez-Torres.  Justice Stephen 
Breyer’s opinion for the Court in Almendarez-Torres rested on several 
prior decisions, but they do not support the holding.  The Court leaned 
on Graham from 1912157 and Oyler v. Boles from 1962,158 both involving 
defendants who had been convicted and sentenced under the 
supplemental information approach used in Virginia and West 
Virginia.159  In both cases, the Court rejected claims that failing to allege 
a prior conviction in the initial indictment violated the due process 
protections provided by the Fourteenth Amendment.  It concluded that 
the common law practice of including prior conviction allegations in the 
charging instrument and proving them to the jury was optional in the 
states.160  
Importantly, both cases construed the limitations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause on states, and not the scope of the 
Indictment Clause in the Fifth Amendment at stake in Almendarez-
Torres, which does not apply in state courts.161  More importantly, both 
cases were decided before the Court declared that the Constitution 
required state courts to provide either reasonable notice of the charge162 
 
157. See supra notes 141–43 and accompanying text discussing Graham v. West Virginia, 
224 U.S. 616 (1912). 
158. 368 U.S. 448 (1962).  
159. In Oyler, the defendant’s sentence was boosted from an eighteen-year maximum to 
life after he was charged with being a recidivist.  Unlike Graham, whose sentence was also 
raised to life only after the prior offense allegations were proven to a jury, Oyler admitted 
that he was the same person named in the habitual information.  Id. at 450. 
160. Id. at 454 (“The petitioners’ claim that they were deprived of due process because 
of inadequate opportunity to contest the habitual criminal accusation must be rejected in 
these cases.”); Graham, 224 U.S. at 625 (“It cannot be said that the prisoner was deprived of 
due process of law. . . .  Provision for a separate, and subsequent, determination of his identity 
with the former convict has not been regarded as a deprivation of any fundamental right.”). 
161. Graham, 224 U.S. at 623, 627 (relying on Hurtado in rejecting the state prisoner’s 
claim and noting that states are not bound by requirements of the Federal Constitution). 
162. The Sixth Amendment right to reasonable notice of the charge was not clearly 
recognized for state defendants until 1967, five years after the decision in Oyler; although 
dictum suggesting this appeared in 1948.  See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 137, at § 2.6(a) 
(noting the Court’s reliance in Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 20 (1967), on the dictum in 
In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948), that had treated the notice guarantee as equal in 
standing to those other rights, was viewed as indicating that a person’s Sixth Amendment 
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or the right to a jury trial for criminal cases.163  The majority in Oyler 
also noted that an alternative basis for its decision was that the 
defendant failed to raise his objection on time.164 
Two other cases relied on by the Court in Almendarez-Torres have 
since been overruled, one just this past summer by Alleyne.165  The Court 
also quoted several other cases stating that a prior conviction allegation 
“goes as to the punishment only” and is not an element of the offense, 
but all of those cases involved claims that increasing a sentence for a 
prior conviction was improper punishment for the prior offense.166  In 
 
right “to reasonable notice of the charge against him” also was to be selectively 
incorporated).  The Oyler dissenters also pointed out that Graham was decided before the 
Court had broadened the scope of habeas review of state decisions.  Oyler, 368 U.S. at 463 n.2 
(Douglas, J., dissenting). 
163. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (declaring that the Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial is part of the due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to every state felony defendant). 
164. Oyler, 368 U.S. at 454; see also id. at 458 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Counsel could 
have requested a continuance in order to look into the validity of the previous convictions or 
other possible defenses to the recidivist charges, or, if there was any doubt, to establish the 
identities of the previous offenders.  They chose not to do so, and I think this choice 
forecloses the petitioners’ claims that they were not given adequate notice and opportunity to 
prepare a defense.”); L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 618 (stating that Oyler 
obscured rather than clarified the question of advance notice).  
165. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 247 (citing Walton v. Arizona, 
497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled in part by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); McMillan v. 
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986), overruled by Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 
(2013)).  
166. The phrase was first used by the Court in 1895.  Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 
677 (1895) (“go as to the punishment only” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  In Moore 
and in McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 331 (1901), the Court addressed claims that the 
defendant had been punished twice for the prior offense, that such double punishment 
violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that by counting prior convictions 
that preceded the passage of the prior offender law, the state had violated ex post facto 
principles in the Federal Constitution.  In each case, the Court explained that the state had 
not violated the Fourteenth Amendment, which was no surprise, considering at the time that 
Amendment was believed to provide essentially no protection for state criminal defendants 
other than to bar deliberate differential treatment by race.  Federal double jeopardy 
protections, for example, were not applied to the states until 1969.  See Benton v. Maryland, 
395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969).  Indeed, to emphasize that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause had no bearing on state criminal justice, the Court in Moore cited its earlier 
decision upholding a miscegenation conviction under an Alabama statute that also punished 
second-offense fornication more severely than for the first offense.  Moore, 159 U.S. at 678 
(citing Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882)).  
 The Court in Almendarez-Torres also relied on Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 55 
(1914) and Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 732 (1948).  In Carlesi, the Court rejected a 
defendant’s claim that the subsequent pardon of an offense barred its use as a prior 
conviction boosting a sentence.  Carlesi admitted his prior conviction, and the case presented 
no issue of pleading or proof.  Carlesi, 233 U.S. at 56.  In Gryger, the defendant also admitted 
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each, the Court explained that the heightened punishment was not 
punishment for the prior conviction but, instead, “a stiffened penalty for 
the latest crime.”167  None of these cases would be affected by 
abandoning the exception and overruling Almendarez-Torres. 
One holding of the Supreme Court that would be doomed should 
the Court overrule Almendarez-Torres is Monge v. California.168  Monge 
was a three-strikes case decided just three months after Almendarez-
Torres by the same five to four majority.  The Court acknowledged that 
if Monge’s prior strike had been an element, then retrial would have 
been barred because an appellate court had found the state’s evidence 
of the strike was insufficient.  Because of Almendarez-Torres, however, 
the Court concluded that the prior conviction was not an element and 
consequently retrial was not barred.169  With nothing but Almendarez-
Torres to stand on, Monge will and should fall.170 
D. Policy: Managing Jury Prejudice 
Nor should policy arguments keep the exception alive.  The justices 
have worried that allowing a prosecutor to prove prior convictions that 
raise the sentence range in jury trials like other elements would be 
unfair to defendants.171  This could be a serious dilemma for defendants, 
 
his prior conviction but raised ex post facto and double jeopardy challenges to the sentence 
increase for his prior conviction.  Gryger, 334 U.S. at 729–30.  The Court rejected Gryger’s 
argument that the state denied him due process when it failed to appoint him counsel for his 
trial on the prior conviction allegations, explaining that it had just held that states have no 
federal constitutional obligation to provide counsel to defendants who pled guilty to 
noncapital offenses.  Id. at 731. 
167. Id. at 732 (emphasis added).   
168. 524 U.S. 721 (1998). 
169. Id. at 729–34. 
170. If the Court is willing to decouple the treatment under the indictment clause and 
the right to notice from the right to a jury determination beyond a reasonable doubt, then it 
could abolish the exception from the jury and burden of proof protections and leave 
Almendarez-Torres’s holding on indictments standing.  But a majority appears to believe that 
element status under the Indictment Clause determines element status under the Jury Clause 
and vice versa.  The Alleyne opinion, for example, repeatedly referred to the concept of 
notice and to elements that must be included in the indictment.  See Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 
2159–60; see also id. at 2164 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting “prosecutors are perfectly 
able to ‘charge facts upon which a mandatory minimum sentence is based in the indictment 
and prove them to a jury.’  Indeed, even with Harris in place, prosecutors already sometimes 
charge such facts and seek to prove them to a jury” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Harris 
v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 581 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting))).  There is considerable 
disagreement in the states regarding the notice required for facts that fall within the Apprendi 
rule.  See supra note 137 (collecting authority). 
171. E.g., Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234–35 (“[T]he introduction of evidence of a 
defendant’s prior crimes risks significant prejudice.  Even if a defendant’s stipulation were to 
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as research has shown that jurors will “infer guilt directly from the 
existence of prior convictions.”172  Although this was not the original 
reason for the supplemental information procedure when first adopted 
in Virginia and Massachusetts, as noted above in Part I, it later became 
one of its most popular justifications.173  But the risk that courts will be 
unable to manage jury prejudice given the need to prove a prior 
conviction is not a constitutional problem, depriving a defendant of the 
right to notice and proof beyond a reasonable doubt of an element 
clearly is.  In the 1967 decision Spencer v. Texas,174 the defendant, who 
had received timely notice and a jury trial on the prior conviction 
allegations, argued that due process required states to abandon one-
stage habitual offender trials and use bifurcated proceedings.  The Court 
disagreed, observing that “[t]he common-law procedure for applying 
recidivist statutes . . . which requires allegations and proof of past 
convictions in the current trial, is, of course, the simplest and best 
known procedure.”175  The Court was “unwilling” to mandate that states 
change this basic process.  Although several justices have expressed the 
belief that bifurcation is the better approach,176 the Court has yet to 
mandate it as a matter of constitutional law.  It has held, however, that 
in federal criminal trials, “when proof of convict status is at issue” 
before a jury, and a defendant offers to stipulate to that status, the 
Federal Rules of Evidence bar admission of additional information 
about the prior conviction.177 
 
keep the name and details of the previous offense from the jury, see Old Chief v. United 
States, 519 U.S. 172, 178–79 (1997), jurors would still learn, from the indictment, the judge, or 
the prosecutor, that the defendant had committed an aggravated felony. . . .  [W]e do not 
believe, other things being equal, that Congress would have wanted to create this kind of 
unfairness in respect to facts that are almost never contested.” (internal citation omitted)). 
172. See ROBERTS, supra note 1, at 210; see also Nancy J. King, Juries and Prior 
Convictions: Managing the Demise of the Prior Conviction Exception to Apprendi (draft 
available from author). 
173. See, e.g., Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 752–53 (1852); Tyson v. 
Hening, 136 S.E.2d 832, 835–37 (Va. 1964) (citing McCallister v. Commonwealth, 161 S.E. 67 
(Va. 1931)); State ex rel. Edelstein v. Huneke, 249 P. 784, 786 (Wash. 1926). 
174. 385 U.S. 554 (1967). 
175. Id. at 563, 566. 
176. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438–39 n.6 (1983); D. Michael Risinger, 
John Henry Wigmore, Johnny Lynn Old Chief, and “Legitimate Moral Force”—Keeping the 
Courtroom Safe for Heartstrings and Gore, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 403, 425 (1998) (noting that in 
Spencer “the entire Supreme Court—majority, concurrence, and dissent alike—asserted that, 
were the decision up to them on a legislative basis, they would adopt a two-stage procedure”). 
177. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190–91 (1997) (interpreting FRE 403 in a 
922(g) trial: “The most the jury needs to know is that the conviction admitted by the 
defendant falls within the class of crimes that Congress thought should bar a convict from 
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Moreover, it is not true that treating a penalty-raising prior 
conviction as an element will irreparably impair the fairness of a jury 
trial and increase even further the pressure to admit guilt.  Courts and 
legislatures have already developed and applied effective methods of 
handling these issues.  In many states prior convictions are jury 
questions—in felony firearm cases,178 habitual offender cases,179 and cases 
in which a prior conviction elevates a misdemeanor to a felony180 or a 
lesser offense to a greater one.181  Courts have managed the risk of 
prejudice using bifurcation,182 requiring courts to accept stipulations to 
limit what the jury hears about the prior conviction,183 allowing the 
defendant to waive the jury for the prior-conviction element alone,184 
and barring any mention of a prior conviction if admitted by the 
defendant, something like a partial plea of guilty.185  And they have been 
doing this for nearly 200 years.186  
 
possessing a gun, and this point may be made readily in a defendant’s admission and 
underscored in the court’s jury instructions.”). 
178. E.g., United States v. Wilson, 2013 WL 5716805 (10th Cir. Oct. 22, 2013); State v. 
Summers, 846 P.2d 490 (Wash. 1993). 
179. King, supra note 172. 
180. E.g., State v. Oster, 52 P.3d 26, 28–29 (Wash. 2002); State v. Benitez, 302 P.3d 877, 
881 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013); State v. Cochrane, 253 P.3d 95, 97 (Wash. Ct. App. 2011). 
181. King, supra note 172. 
182. Id.  Bifurcation is already used to establish other facts deemed elements under 
Apprendi.  See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 7.07B reporter’s note c at 314–15 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (listing authority for bifurcated proceedings, including KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 21–4718(b)(2), (4) (2006); MINN. STAT. § 244.10, subd. 5(b) (2006); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. § 15A–1340.16(a)(1) (2006); ORE. REV. STAT. ch. 463, § 3(1), (4) (2006); and WASH. 
REV. CODE § 9.94A.537(3), (4) (2006)). 
183. Old Chief v. United States,  519 U.S. 172, 191–92; King, supra note 172.  
184. California, Arizona, and Colorado retained the common law approach early on, 
requiring the prior conviction be pleaded in the indictment, but permitting the defendant the 
option of admitting the prior convictions and then barring any mention of them to the jury 
during the trial of the charged offense, except for impeachment.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 44-1004 (1939); People v. Wheatley, 26 P. 95, 96 (Cal. 1891) (describing prior law). 
185. For a proposal to allow such selective waiver, see MODEL PENAL CODE: 
SENTENCING § 7.07B(8) at 299 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007). 
186. State v. Ferrone, 113 A. 452, 456 (Conn. 1921); Kilbourn v. State, 9 Conn. 560, 562–
63 (1833); L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 614–15 (collecting authority); Sidikman, 
supra note 146, at 215; McWhorter v. State, 44 S.E. 873, 874 (Ga. 1903) (construing a statute 
providing for an enhanced punishment for subsequent offenses, the court held that, since the 
allegation and proof of the prior conviction would tend to prejudice the rights of the 
defendant, such allegation and proof must not be made until after the prisoner has been 
convicted of the principal offense).  Oregon replaced the common law practice with this 
approach in 1927 for felonies.  See Louise Denae Dale, Criminal Law: Procedure: Propriety of 
Jury Consideration of Prior Offenses, 5 UCLA L. REV. 320, 320–21 (1958).  A number of 
states adopted this approach after World War II.  L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12, at 615 
n.92 (listing authority from Illinois, Maine, Utah, and Washington).  
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As for the policy reason that initially led to the alternative charging 
practice from which the exception grew, that reason has vanished.  The 
departure from the common law that allowed courts to increase 
sentences based on criminal history alleged only after conviction was 
built on the realities of a world that no longer exists, when a person’s 
true identity was unknowable, before technology made accessing an 
individual’s image, aliases, prints, and criminal history easy and cheap.  
Identification today no longer must await commitment to prison.  
Instead, it occurs in plenty of time for prosecutors to include prior 
convictions that raise the sentence range in the initial charging 
instrument.  This information is routinely retrieved before or soon after 
arrest.  Law enforcement has been submitting and retrieving fingerprints 
electronically through the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System for about fifteen years.187  The largest biometric 
database in the world, it contains fingerprints and criminal histories for 
more than seventy million people and reportedly matches fingerprints in 
an average time of thirty minutes.188  All fifty states and the District of 
Columbia have been participating since 1993.189  Even though the 
difficulty of identifying prior offenders may once have provided a reason 
to allow prosecutors to postpone allegations and proof of criminal 
history until after conviction, that reason no longer exists.190  
 
187. James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use, and Availability of 
Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 210–11 (2008). 
188. Fingerprints & Other Biometrics, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Dec. 13, 2013); 
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Dec. 13, 2013). 
189. National Criminal History Improvement Program, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=47 (last visited Dec. 13, 2013).   
190. There is yet another rationale that has been advanced to justify why prior 
convictions, unlike other facts that raise sentencing ranges, need not be proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt—namely, that the defendant already had those same protections 
for the prior conviction.  E.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 249 (1999) (explaining that 
the recidivism exception was permitted because “a prior conviction must itself have been 
established through procedures satisfying the fair notice, reasonable doubt, and jury trial 
guarantees”); Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2300 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the need to limit proof to prevent violations of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right 
and arguing that, “When the modified categorical approach is used to decide whether ‘a jury 
was actually required to find all the elements of [a] generic [offense],’ the defendant has 
already enjoyed his Sixth Amendment right to a jury determination of those elements” 
(quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 602 (1990))); Andrew Sokol, Juvenile 
Adjudications as Elevating Factors in Subsequent Adult Sentencing and the Structural Role of 
the Jury, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 791, 798–99 (2011) (stating that the exception can be 
reconciled with the rationale of Apprendi only because the facts necessary to prove the prior 
conviction in the first instance were presented to a jury that adjudged them true beyond a 
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E. Stare Decisis: Eroded Doctrine, Shifting Votes 
If all of the possible justifications for the prior-conviction exception 
to the Apprendi rule are as weak as suggested here, the Court is unlikely 
to decide that stare decisis warrants keeping it on life support any 
longer.  Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg have already made their opposition to the exception clear,191 so 
its demise would require only two more votes from Justices Stephen 
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor, or Elena Kagan.  In Alleyne, Justice Breyer 
agreed to overrule as “anomalous” the Court’s decision exempting facts 
that raise the minimum sentence from the Apprendi rule, a decision that 
he had authored.  The exception for prior convictions is equally, if not 
more, anomalous, and he may be ready to overrule his prior opinion for 
the Court in Almendarez-Torres as well.  And the justification that 
Justices Sotomayor and Kagan provided in Alleyne is equally applicable 
here: When prosecutors are perfectly able to charge and prove these 
facts to a jury, “stare decisis does not compel adherence to a decision 
whose ‘underpinnings’ have been ‘eroded’ by subsequent developments 
of constitutional law.”192  The Court will have no shortage of cases 
presenting the issue squarely, including a case remanded for 
reconsideration in light of Alleyne.193 
 
reasonable doubt).  But this “previously enjoyed rights” theory misses two key points.  First, a 
jury found someone guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but it may not have been this 
defendant.  Second, the theory fails entirely to address the lack of notice that results when a 
defendant is asked to decide whether to contest an alleged offense before he learns that 
because of a prior offense, conviction would carry a much longer sentence. 
191. See, e.g., Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2294–95 (Thomas, J., concurring); Shepard v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26–28 (2005) (Thomas, J. concurring); Monge v. California, 524 
U.S. 721, 737–39 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 
224, 247–70 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 547 U.S. 1200 
(2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224), denying cert. to 168 
F. App’x 616 (5th Cir. 2006). 
192. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2164–66 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  Commentators and lower courts have detailed how the foundation for the rule 
in Almendarez-Torres has been eroded as well.  E.g., United States v. Adame-Orozco, 607 
F.3d 647, 651 n.6 (10th Cir. 2010) (questioning the continuing viability of Almendarez-Torres); 
Nichols v. United States, 563 F.3d 240, 243 n.1 (6th Cir. 2009) (noting a question concerning 
the status of the Almendarez-Torres decision). 
193. See United States v. Abrahamson, 731 F.3d 751, 752 (8th Cir. 2013) (“Because the 
challenged enhancement of Abrahamson’s sentence was based solely on his prior felony drug 
conviction, it continues to fall under the recidivism exception to the jury presentation 
requirement that the Court recognized in Almendarez–Torres and left unchanged in 
Alleyne.”).  Understandably, courts of appeals are dutifully applying the Court’s precedent, 
but often note its uncertain future.  E.g., United States v. Torres–Alvarado, 416 F.3d 808, 810 
(8th Cir. 2005) (“While it is unclear whether Almendarez–Torres and its felony exception will 
remain good law, we are bound by Almendarez–Torres until the Supreme Court explicitly 
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Discarding the exception for prior convictions will finally end cases 
like David Appleby’s.194  Appleby pleaded guilty to two charges: third-
offense DUI and third-offense driving on a revoked license.  At his plea 
proceeding, he was informed that his maximum sentence on each charge 
was three years, for six years total.  Not until after his plea and 
conviction did the prosecuting attorney file a “recidivist information,” 
which alleged that Appleby was “the same person who has been five 
times previously convicted in the State of West Virginia for crimes 
punishable by confinement in a penitentiary, [and] should be sentenced 
to be confined in the state correctional facility for life.”195  A jury found 
Appleby to be the same person who was convicted before, and the judge 
sentenced him to life in prison.  In 2010, a divided panel of the Fourth 
Circuit, relying on Almendarez-Torres, rejected Appleby’s constitutional 
challenge.  But in dissent, Judge Traxler cut to the heart of the problem: 
“Appleby was sentenced to life on the charges to which he pleaded 
guilty after being told that he could be sentenced to no more than six 
years.”196  It is time for the Court to require prosecutors in West Virginia 
to do what prosecutors elsewhere seem to have no trouble doing: 
determine whether the defendant is eligible for repeat-offender 
punishment, decide whether to pursue that punishment, and provide 
formal notice of that intent before conviction.197   
The Court cannot have it both ways: If a recidivist premium is not 
additional punishment for the prior convictions, then it is punishment 
for the charged offense, and the Constitution requires that the 
defendant be informed of the actual maximum sentence he faces if 
convicted of that charged offense, before he decides whether or not to 
admit it.  And whenever a higher sentence range turns on the presence 
of a prior conviction, that fact must be alleged as part of the charge and 
proven like any other element. 
 
overrules it.” (internal citation omitted)). 
194. See Appleby v. Warden, 595 F.3d 532 (4th Cir. 2010). 
195. Id. at 534. 
196. Id. at 544 (Traxler, J., dissenting) (emphasis altered). 
197. Unlike most state courts, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 136, § 21.4(d), courts in 
Washington and West Virginia have held that if application of a habitual criminal statute is 
not automatic and would require commencement of a separate proceeding, then it is a 
collateral consequence about which the defendant need not be warned.  State v. Ward, 869 
P.2d 1062, 1075 (Wash. 1994).  Consider also United States v. Rodriquez, 553 U.S. 377, 383–84 
(2008) (“If the judge told the defendant that the maximum possible sentence was 10 years and 
then imposed a sentence of 15 years based on ACCA [a provision authorizing a higher 
sentence for those with prior convictions], the defendant would have been sorely misled and 
would have a ground for moving to withdraw the plea.”). 
KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:15 PM 
564 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [97:3 
V. CONCLUSION 
We need not eliminate the use of criminal history in allocating 
punishment.  Compared to alternative reasons for calibrating sentences, 
criminal history will continue to have the advantage of relative 
objectivity and widespread public support.198  Escalated penalties for 
prior offenders are here to stay.  But the way in which these 
punishments are applied will and should change.  
State courts, legislatures, and sentencing commissions are already 
revisiting the use of criminal history in sentencing to respond to the 
Court’s expansion of the Apprendi rule, to incorporate risk assessment 
tools, and to trim corrections costs.199  Whenever these provisions are 
considered, lawmakers should take the opportunity not only to bring 
these rules into compliance with the Constitution, but also to revise 
them in light of new information about their effects.200  For example, if a 
criminal history aggravator is supposed to isolate the most violent 
offenders for incapacitation, then the prior convictions that trigger 
lengthier sentences should be narrowed to those that predict that type of 
behavior, and parole or similar release provisions should be made 
available for those who by anyone’s measure do not pose that risk, such 
as the elderly and the very ill.201  If the goal of a provision is 
incarcerating those most likely to reoffend, then it should not increase 
sentences based on features of criminal history that have little predictive 
 
198. Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 290 (noting that the use of an objective measure 
like criminal history is attractive for the same reason numerical guidelines and risk scores are: 
they “standardize decision-making criteria, enhance the defensibility of decisions, and insure 
that all the players in the system are working with the ‘same information,’” allowing judges 
and prosecutors to defend their decisions to the electorate); see also Frase, supra note 134, at 
119 (“[A]ccurate prior conviction information is more readily available than most other 
evidence supporting the underlying rationales, and lends itself to simpler decision rules.”). 
199. Such as in California, last year adopting Proposition 36 to narrow the scope of 
eligible offenses and thereby reduce the number of nonviolent offenders sentenced to life 
under these provisions.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1210(a) (West Supp. 2004); see also MODEL 
PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6A.07 cmt. b at 135 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) 
(“[I]ncremental adjustments in variables such as criminal-history scoring may have substantial 
aggregate effects.”). 
200. See also Hannah-Moffat, supra note 90, at 291 (urging legislators and courts to “pay 
[more] attention to how, why, and based on what ‘evidence’ [they] can justify [deprivations] 
of liberty based on risk scores” and past convictions); Petersilia & Turner, supra note 102, at 
175 (calling for “researchers and policymakers in each state [to] discuss openly the objectives 
of their guidelines and establish the correlation of commonly used factors with both 
recidivism and race for their criminal populations . . . to address the equity issue in an 
informed light”). 
201. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 305.1 at 65 (Tentative Draft 
No. 2, 2011). 
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power.202  Changes like these may seem small, but the potential impact 
can be significant, not only for those branded as convicted criminals 
(although not literally any longer), but for everyone who bears the costs 
of the use of incarceration to control criminal conduct. 
  
 
202. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, ANNUAL REPORT 8 (2010) (concluding that 
additional criminal history points when offense occurred within two years of prior conviction 
should be eliminated); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, COMPUTATION OF “RECENCY” 
CRIMINAL HISTORY POINTS UNDER USSG 22 (2010) (finding that eliminating “recency 
points” would have decreased predictive power only slightly but would have reduced the 
average sentence of affected offenders by 16.3%). 
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VI. APPENDIX: LAW ON CHARGING PRIOR CONVICTIONS, BY STATE 
(YEAR STATEHOOD) 
Alabama (1819) appeared to follow the common law rule on charging 
prior convictions until 1944 even though, from 1909 on, it was one of the 
very few states that permitted the judge (as opposed to the jury) to 
determine whether the defendant had been convicted before.  See 
Johnson v. State, 130 So. 777, 778 (Ala. 1930) (citing Carson v. State, 19 
So. 32 (Ala. 1896)) (noting that in order for a mandatory minimum 
hard-labor sentence for second offenders to apply, the “indictment or 
complaint in the case must aver a violation of the preceding section, 
making the former conviction a material issue on the trial of the case”); 
Lyles v. State, 88 So. 375, 376 (Ala. Ct. App. 1921) (noting Act of Jan. 
25, 1919, no. 7, § 20, 1919 Ala. Acts 6, 17; Act of June 30, 1915, no. 1, 
§§ 3, 14, 1915 Ala. Acts 1, 2, 6; and Act of Aug. 9, 1909, no. 7, § 3, 1909 
Ala. Acts 8, 9–10); Rosenberg v. State, 59 So. 366, 368 (Ala. Ct. App. 
1912).  In 1944, the state’s high court held that more severe second and 
third offender penalties could be imposed without an allegation of the 
prior offense in the indictment upon a finding of the prior offense by a 
judge at a “hearing, full and open, in which the defendant should be 
present and represented by counsel, if he desires, and it should be tried 
and reported as any other feature of the trial.”  Yates v. State, 17 So. 2d 
777, 779–80 (Ala. 1944) (internal citations omitted). 
 
Arkansas (1836) followed the common law rule on charging prior 
convictions as late as 1951, although cases since then allow the state to 
amend the charge to add prior conviction allegations after trial begins.  
See Finch v. State, 556 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Ark. 1977) (permitting 
amendment during trial); Robbins v. State, 242 S.W.2d 640, 643 (Ark. 
1951) (collecting authority requiring allegation of prior offenses); Hettle 
v. State, 222 S.W. 1066, 1067 (Ark. 1920) (reversing conviction where 
indictment did not charge a second offense, noting that “the offense of 
illegal cohabitation is a graded crime, and the fact of whether it was a 
first, second, or third offense is an element in the punishment thereof” 
because “[e]very indictment, for whatever offense, must set out all the 
facts which in law may influence the punishment for the commission 
thereof” (quoting Kightlinger v. State, 150 S.W. 690, 690 (Ark. 1912)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Thomas v. State, 620 S.W.2d 300, 
301–02 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981) (permitting the amendment of the 
information on date of trial to include “habitual offender” charge). 
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California (1850) followed the common law rule on charging prior 
convictions, providing for the portion of the information alleging the 
prior conviction to be kept from the jury if the defendant admitted or 
confessed the prior conviction.  See State v. O'Neill, 248 P. 215, 217 
(Mont. 1926) (discussing California precedent); People v. Meyer, 15 P. 
95, 96 (Cal. 1887) (noting that it is error to inform the jury of a previous 
conviction when the defendant had already confessed to it).  It continues 
to do so, although it switched to bifurcated trials in 1981.  See People v. 
Saunders, 853 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Cal. 1993) (noting decision adopting 
bifurcation in 1981 and subsequent codification of that requirement); 
People v. Coleman, 79 P. 283 (Cal. 1904) (holding prior offense properly 
charged and tried with other elements); People v. Stanley, 47 Cal. 113, 
115 (1873). 
 
Colorado (1876) continues to follow the common law rule on charging.  
See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801 (West 2013) (“Such former 
conviction or convictions and judgment or judgments shall be set forth 
in apt words in the indictment or information.”); Lakomy v. People, 178 
P. 571, 572 (Colo. 1919) (finding the information properly charged the 
former conviction, which was an issue before the jury).  A 1929 statute 
authorized the supplemental charging process, but, reasoning that “[i]f 
the former conviction be not charged, but may be established by 
evidence, [the] defendant would plead at his peril and might be 
confronted with a penalty undreamed of,” the state’s high court held 
that “[i]f, before trial, the district attorney knows of such, and has any 
discretion in the matter, he must charge or waive.”  Smalley v. People, 
43 P.2d 385, 385–86 (Colo. 1935); see also People v. Rieger, 128 P.3d 295, 
296 (Colo. App. 2005) (“[T]he trial court misinterpreted the plain 
language of § 18-1.3-803(6) when it allowed the prosecutor to file two 
habitual criminal counts against Rieger after he had pled guilty, despite 
the prosecutor’s prior knowledge of the convictions.  Contrary to the 
trial court’s ruling, the statute does not allow a prosecutor, for good 
cause or otherwise, to add known habitual criminal counts after a guilty 
plea has been accepted.”). 
 
Connecticut (1788) followed the common law rule on charging and still 
does.  State v. Bjorklund, 830 A.2d 1141, 1159 (Conn. App. Ct. 2003); 
State v. Riley, 110 A. 550, 552–53 (Conn. 1920) (collecting authority) 
(“[I]f the state intends to make any claim to raise the penalty by reason 
of such prior conviction, the defendant should in the information be 
apprised of this additional element upon which such claim of the state is 
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to be based.  It is accordingly a uniform rule that such additional 
allegations relating to the penalty alone should be incorporated in the 
information. . . .  [W]e cannot see why the allegations necessary to 
invoke the severer penalty provided by the statute in case of two prior 
convictions are not properly and correctly stated in the information 
before us.”); State v. Ryan, 37 A. 377, 378 (Conn. 1897) (“[T]he 
existence of a first offense is, of course, one of the essential elements of 
the charge and must be alleged in some way, or the charge will be fatally 
defective . . . .”).  
 
Delaware (1787) A second offense liquor law was enacted in 1915, and it 
appears that the prior offense was part of the indictment then.  See State 
v. Legg, 93 A. 556, 557 (Del. 1915).  In 1953, a Superior Court decision 
suggested that the supplemental information was the best approach.  
State v. Owens, 101 A.2d 319, 320 (Del. Super. Ct. 1953) (stating with 
regard to the 1953 habitual offender law that “an acceptable 
procedure . . . would consist of something less formal than an indictment 
but of more dignity than a mere motion.  This would be by way of a 
supplemental information immediately following the fourth conviction 
for felony.  Upon such an information, defendant could be arraigned 
and plead guilty or not guilty.  In the rare case where a not guilty plea is 
entered, the only normal issue of fact for determination would be 
whether or not defendant had been convicted four times for felony” 
(internal citations omitted)); see also Gibbs v. State, 208 A.2d 306, 308 
(Del. 1965) (“The origination and evolution of the procedure, used to 
implement our Habitual Criminal Act, appear in State v. Owens, [101 
A.2d 319] and in 11 Del.C. § 3912 [providing for a separate information 
to be filed anytime before conviction or sentence].  It appears that 
§ 3912 was enacted as the result of the Owens case in which the court 
noted the lack of a procedure for implementing the Act.  The court 
there prescribed the proceeding by information as a means of utilizing 
the Act with due regard for the demands of due process of law.”).  The 
defendant retained the option of seeking a determination of habitual 
offender status beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury.  See Gibbs, 208 
A.2d at 307 n.1 (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3912(b)).  The statute 
provided that prior convictions aggravating the punishment for an 
offense other than those under the habitual offender statute were 
proven to the judge at sentencing.  Gibbs, 208 A.2d at 307 n.1 (citing 
§ 3912(a)); Mergenthaler v. State, 239 A.2d 635, 638–39 (Del. 1968).  
Today, proof of prior convictions is made at sentencing before a judge, 
and notice need not be given before conviction, see Roten v. State, No. 
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108, 2010, 2010 WL 3860663, at *2 (Del. Oct. 4, 2010), but the fact of 
prior conviction must be established beyond a reasonable doubt, see 
Morales v. State, 696 A.2d 390, 395 (Del. 1997). 
 
Florida (1845) followed the common law rule on charging prior 
convictions until the passage of a statute in 1927.  See Sparkman v. State 
Prison Custodian, 18 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1944) (“[I]t is generally 
necessary to allege in an indictment the fact of a prior conviction, and 
during the trial support said allegation by admitting into evidence a 
certified copy of the record or by other competent evidence, in order to 
subject an accused to the enhanced punishment . . . .”); Cross v. State, 
119 So. 380, 385–87 (Fla. 1928) (upholding second proceeding under 
second information filed pursuant to 1927 statute, against ex post facto, 
double jeopardy, right to jury trial, equal protection, and due process 
challenges, relying upon Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912)); 
Benson v. State, 101 So. 231, 231 (Fla. 1924) (the jury must expressly 
determine separately the question of the historical fact of the 
defendant’s former conviction as alleged); State ex rel. Lockmiller v. 
Mayo, 101 So. 228, 229 (Fla. 1924) (noting a “prior conviction was a 
necessary element in the so-called felony” when second offense was a 
felony and first offense a misdemeanor); Smith v. State, 78 So. 530, 532 
(Fla. 1918) (“The defendant must be charged with having been before 
convicted of a like offense if it is intended to charge him with the felony 
of selling liquors as a second offense.”); see also Reynolds v. Cochran, 
365 U.S. 525, 529 n.6 (1961) (quoting 1957 Florida statute authorizing 
proceeding at any time after conviction).  For prior convictions boosting 
penalties under other statutes other than its repeat offender provision, 
Florida courts continued to follow the common law rule.  Johnson v. 
State, 229 So. 2d 13, 14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969) (“The question that is 
before us here is whether in those cases where the statute provides 
increased punishment for the commission of successive related offenses, 
one may be sentenced as a second or third or subsequent offender 
without having been so charged and the allegations proved in an 
adversary proceeding conducted with all due process safeguards.  This 
must be answered in the negative.”). 
 
Georgia (1788) followed the common law rule on charging until a 1974 
statute permitted prior convictions the state “made known” to the 
defendant before trial to be found by a judge at a hearing after 
conviction.  See Act of Mar. 20, 1974, no. 854, § 7, 1974 Ga. Laws 352, 
357 (codified as amended at GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2503) (providing 
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“only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the 
defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible”); State v. Hendrixson, 
310 S.E.2d 526, 528 (Ga. 1984) (relying on § 27-2503 and upholding life 
sentence based on prior offenses when those prior offenses were not set 
out in the indictment); see also Elrod v. Caldwell, 209 S.E.2d 207, 208 
(Ga. 1974) (“[T]he appellant was not charged as a recidivist and could 
not have been sentenced as a second offender by the trial court.”); 
Riggins v. Stynchcombe, 203 S.E.2d 208, 212 (Ga. 1974) (applying a 1969 
statute that required a two-stage trial, but holding that “[f]or one to 
receive recidivist punishment he must have been indicted under a 
recidivist statute, his prior convictions having been considered by the 
Grand Jury and having been included in the indictment.  In short, one 
cannot be indicted by a Grand Jury for only one offense carrying a 
maximum punishment, and then have that maximum punishment 
increased at the election of the state’s prosecuting officers” (emphasis 
added)); Studdard v. State, 169 S.E.2d 327, 328 (Ga. 1969) (“It would be 
a travesty of justice to permit an accusation . . . to charge a felony 
punishable by imprisonment for one period of time and then to permit 
evidence to be introduced which would authorize imprisonment for a 
longer period of time.”); Tribble v. State, 148 S.E. 593, 595 (Ga. 1929) 
(“The fact of a former conviction and sentence must be charged in the 
indictment, where a second conviction would affect the grade of the 
offense or require the imposition of a different punishment.”); 
McWhorter v. State, 44 S.E. 873, 874 (Ga. 1903) (“Where the second 
conviction changes the grade of the offense, or authorizes a higher 
penalty than could otherwise have been imposed, the former conviction 
enters as an element into the new offense, and must be alleged as a 
necessary part of the description and character of the crime intended to 
be punished.”); Hines v. State, 26 Ga. 614, 616 (Ga. 1859) (“The 
allegation is certainly one of the first importance to the accused, for if it 
is true, he becomes subject to a greatly increased punishment.”); Peavy 
v. State, 283 S.E.2d 346, 350–51 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981) (holding a separate 
allegation and jury determination were not required since the 1974 law 
required “the judge in non-death penalty cases where a guilty verdict is 
returned to dismiss the jury and conduct a presentence hearing wherein 
‘the judge shall hear additional evidence in . . . aggravation of 
punishment, including the record of any criminal convictions and pleas 
of guilty’” (alteration in original) (quoting § 27-2503)). 
 
Idaho (1890), like California, followed the common law rule on charging 
and still does, but adopted a bifurcated trial procedure.  State v. Roy, 
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899 P.2d 441, 443 (Idaho 1995) (“In State v. Johnson, this Court 
announced a procedure to be followed where a criminal defendant is 
charged under the persistent violator statute (I.C. § 19–2514).  In such a 
case the information must be prepared in two parts, the first setting 
forth the substantive offense charged, and the second alleging prior 
convictions.  The trial must also be bifurcated.  During the first phase, 
the jury should be read only the first part of the information.  The trial 
should then proceed as if there were no allegations of prior convictions.  
Only if the jury returns a guilty verdict on the substantive charge should 
the second part of the information be read and the jury allowed to 
consider the recidivist charge.” (internal citation omitted) (citing State 
v. Johnson, 383 P.2d 326, 331–32 (Idaho 1963), wherein the court 
adopted a bifurcated trial but still required the reading of allegations 
included in the initial charge, with one part of the information read to 
the jury and the other read only upon conviction of the first part)); State 
v. Lovejoy, 95 P.2d 132, 134 (Idaho 1939) (“[F]ormer convictions relied 
on must be alleged in the indictment or information and proved at the 
trial[,] and the identity of the defendant as the person formerly 
convicted must be established beyond a reasonable doubt.”); State v. 
Scheminisky, 174 P. 611, 611–12 (Idaho 1918) (holding when an accused 
is charged with being a persistent violator of the law, “the former 
conviction[s] must be alleged in the indictment or information and 
proved at the trial”). 
 
Illinois (1818) followed the common law rule on charging when it 
adopted its repeat larceny statute in 1867 and its habitual offender 
statute in 1883.  See Act of June 28, 1867, § 1, 1867 Ill. Laws 37, 37–38; 
Act of June 23, 1883, § 1, 1883 Ill. Laws 76, 76.  It continued to follow 
that rule in repeat-offender cases until the habitual offender statute was 
amended in the late 1950s.  See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 603.3(a) (1959) 
(described in People v. Williams, 599 N.E.2d 913, 918 (Ill. 1992), as 
including a revision that provided in part that “[a] former conviction of a 
felony shall not be alleged in the indictment, and no evidence or other 
disclosure of such conviction shall be presented to the court or the jury 
during the trial of the principal offense”); People v. Robinson, 656 
N.E.2d 1090, 1099 (Ill. 1995) (explaining that, prior to the 1978 
amendment, the Habitual Criminal Act involved alleging a defendant's 
qualifying convictions in the indictment and proving them at trial, but 
the amendment changed the Habitual Criminal Act to a sentencing 
provision); People v. Hayes, 429 N.E.2d 490, 491 (Ill. 1981) (refusing to 
hold that “because the prior conviction elevates the degree of the 
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offense from a misdemeanor to a felony it should be necessary, at the 
risk of prejudice to the accused, that it be alleged in the information and 
proved”); People v. Long, 123 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ill. 1955) (“Unless 
controlled by statute, it is generally held that in order to subject an 
accused to the enhanced punishment for a second or subsequent 
offense, or as an habitual criminal, it is necessary to allege in the 
indictment the fact of the prior conviction.”); Featherstone v. People, 62 
N.E. 684, 685–87 (Ill. 1901) (requiring the former conviction or 
convictions to be “set forth in apt words in the indictment” (citing § 1, 
1867 Ill. Laws at 37–38; § 1, 1883 Ill. Laws at 76); People v. Ramey, 317 
N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (holding “it is necessary to allege 
the previous conviction in the indictment in order to assess the 
enhanced penalty”). 
 
Indiana (1816) codified the common law rule on charging and proof 
before a jury in a 1907 statute, see Act of Feb. 28, 1907, ch. 82, § 1, 1907 
Ind. Acts 109, 109, reenacted in 1926 and thereafter, see Smith v. State, 
87 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Ind. 1949); Kelley v. State, 185 N.E. 453, 455 (Ind. 
1933).  Bifurcation was not required, see Sammons v. State, 199 N.E. 
555, 558 (Ind. 1936); Barr v. State, 187 N.E. 259, 261 (Ind. 1933), until 
1972 when the state’s high court adopted the Connecticut bifurcated 
process, see Shelton v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1017, 1019 (Ind. 1992) (“The 
habitual offender statute was therefore amended to reflect this 
bifurcation requirement.  Under the statute, a jury is not presented with 
an habitual offender charge until after it has determined the defendant's 
guilt or innocence on the underlying felony charge.  If the jury finds the 
defendant guilty, ‘the jury . . . reconvene[s] for the sentencing hearing’ 
on the habitual offender count.” (alteration in original) (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8(c) (West Supp. 1992))); 
Lawrence v. State, 286 N.E.2d 830, 835 (Ind. 1972) (“If they return a 
verdict of guilty, the second part of the information, in which former 
convictions are alleged, should be read to them without reswearing 
them, and they should be charged to inquire on that issue.  Of course, 
the accused may plead guilty to this part of the information, and then no 
further proceedings before or by the jury would be necessary.  No 
reason appears why the accused, if he should choose, might not submit 
this issue to the court without the jury.” (quoting State v. Ferrone, 113 A. 
452, 457–58 (Conn. 1921)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  This 
bifurcated procedure was thereafter extended to other statutes 
aggravating the penalty for a crime committed by a prior offender, see, 
e.g., Minor v. State, 792 N.E.2d 59, 61 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), but not for 
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felon-in-possession cases, see Spearman v. State, 744 N.E.2d 545, 548 
(Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (rejecting bifurcation for felon in possession cases 
because “[i]t is not practical, or even possible, to bifurcate the 
proceedings in this case”).  The statute requiring allegations and proof 
before the jury is still in effect.  IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8(a) (West 
2012).  The state courts in 1975 found no constitutional barrier to filing 
the habitual allegation after conviction, relying on Oyler v. Boyles, 368 
U.S. 448 (1962), although the practice appears to be to file these 
allegations at the same time as the substantive offense.  Lewis v. State, 
337 N.E.2d 516, 520–21 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (“[W]e cannot perceive any 
substantial prejudice to the defendant's rights by permitting the 
proceedings to determine the applicability of the sentence for recidivists 
to be initiated after completion of the trial on the substantive offense.”); 
see also Cheney v. State, 486 N.E.2d 508, 514 (Ind. 1985) (“In the case at 
bar the amendment was filed on September 13, 1983, and trial 
commenced on October 31, 1983.  We find this time period was 
sufficient to permit appellant to adequately prepare his defense.”); Funk 
v. State, 427 N.E.2d 1081, 1087–88 (Ind. 1981) (noting that in cases 
where habitual allegations were added after arraignment but before 
trial, “The right of the State to amend by adding an habitual offender 
count has specifically been approved by this Court.  An information 
may be amended at any time before, during, or after trial so long as it 
does not prejudice the rights of the defendant.” (internal citation 
omitted) (quoting Gilmore v. State, 415 N.E.2d 70, 73 (Ind. 1981)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 
Iowa (1846) followed the common law rule on charging and still does, 
but bifurcated its jury trials in 1966.  See State v. Kukowski, 704 N.W.2d 
687, 691 (Iowa 2005) (recounting history of two-stage trial requirement); 
State v. Robinson, 165 N.W.2d 802, 803–04 (Iowa 1969) (noting history 
of 1966 statute); State v. Smith, 106 N.W. 187, 189 (Iowa 1906) (“[T]he 
statute requires that the fact of former convictions shall be set forth in 
the indictment.  And this but conforms to the general rule governing 
criminal procedure. . . .  The plea of not guilty puts in issue, not only all 
matters of fact essential to the instant crime, but the fact of the alleged 
former convictions of the defendant.  Moreover, as we have seen, the 
statute requires a special finding at the hands of the jury as to the fact of 
such former convictions.” (citations omitted)).  Iowa law presently 
requires the prior conviction to be charged.  IOWA CODE ANN. RULE 
2.6(5) (West 2002 & Supp. 2013) ( “If the offense charged is one for 
which the defendant, if convicted, will be subject by reason of the Code 
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to an increased penalty because of prior convictions, the allegation of 
such convictions, if any, shall be contained in the indictment.  A 
supplemental indictment shall be prepared for the purpose of trial of the 
facts of the current offense only, and shall satisfy all pertinent 
requirements of the Code, except that it shall make no mention, directly 
or indirectly, of the allegation of the prior convictions, and shall be the 
only indictment read or otherwise presented to the jury prior to 
conviction of the current offense.  The effect of this subrule shall be to 
alter the procedure for trying, in one criminal proceeding, the offenses 
appropriate to its provisions, and not to alter in any manner the basic 
elements of an offense as provided by law.”).  
 
Kansas (1861) codified a penalty for former offenders before statehood, 
see State v. Lohrbach, 538 P.2d 678, 681 (Kan. 1975) (citing Act of Feb. 
3, 1859, ch. 28, § 278, 1859 Kan. Sess. Laws 231, 283 (codified at GEN. 
STAT. KAN. ch. 31, § 289 (1868)), but it did not follow the common law 
rule.  Instead, it permitted notice of the enhanced penalty to be given 
after conviction.  Wasson v. State, 499 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Kan. 1972) 
(“[T]he seven-day notice given to the appellant, after his entry of a plea 
of guilty, was sufficient to authorize the state to proceed under the 
habitual criminal act.”); Chance v. State, 408 P.2d 677, 681 (Kan. 1965) 
(“It has never been the rule in Kansas that a defendant in a criminal 
action must be apprised by the State prior to conviction that the State 
intends to invoke the habitual criminal act.”).  Kansas statutes also 
allowed the judge to determine the prior conviction that would raise the 
penalty range.  State v. Woodman, 272 P. 132, 134 (Kan. 1928).  
Interestingly, the state did follow the common law rule for a different 
repeat-offender statute.  A defendant’s former conviction was included 
in the charge and proven to the jury under a persistent violator liquor 
statute passed in 1911.  See State v. King, 141 P. 247, 248 (Kan. 1914) 
(terming “former conviction of a violation of the prohibitory law” the 
other element of the charge to be included in the information).  For the 
high court’s explanation of the different treatment, see Levell v. 
Simpson, 52 P.2d 372, 374 (Kan. 1935) (“The circumspection which our 
procedure exerts to keep the fact of any former convictions for felonies 
away from the jury is to protect the accused from the possibility that in 
his pending trial the jury might conceive a prejudice against him as an 
habitual criminal.  But where a second offense is a separate and distinct 
crime, it must necessarily be so charged in the information, and the 
proof to support the charge in all its details would have to be submitted 
to the jury.  We have one such crime in this state; the persistent violation 
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of the prohibitory law.  A first offense against the prohibitory law (with 
exceptions not here pertinent) is a misdemeanor punishable by a 
moderate fine and jail sentence.  R.S. 21-2101.  But a subsequent 
infraction of the prohibitory law is quite a different and a more serious 
crime.  It is a distinct felony.  R.S. 21–2146.  In such a case, all the 
formalities of a felonious charge should be pleaded in the information.  
Of necessity, too, every material allegation in such an information would 
have to be proved to the satisfaction of a jury.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 
Kentucky (1792) (a jury sentencing state) followed the common law rule 
on charging when it adopted its habitual offender statute in 1881 and 
continues to do so today.  See Price v. Commonwealth, 666 S.W.2d 749, 
750 (Ky. 1984) (“We interpret the PFO[, Persistent Felony Offender,] 
statute as requiring that if the Commonwealth seeks enhancement by 
proof of PFO status, the defendant is entitled to notice of this before the 
trial of the underlying substantive offense.  A separate indictment meets 
this requirement just as does a separate count in the indictment charging 
the substantive offense to which it refers.”); Taylor v. Commonwealth, 3 
Ky. L. Rptr. 783 (1882); Carter v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. Op. 92, 93 
(1881) (“A former conviction must be specifically pleaded, whether 
presented as a defense to an indictment or inserted in that pleading by 
the prosecutor with a view of increasing the punishment.  The fact that 
the accused had been previously indicted for a felony, describing the 
nature of the offense, in a court having jurisdiction, that he was assigned 
and pled to the indictment, and was found guilty and sentenced, etc., are 
facts necessary to be alleged.  The prisoner must know from the 
statements contained in the indictment the former convictions relied 
on.”); Stewart v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. Op. 138, 138 (1881); Clark v. 
Commonwealth, 324 S.W.3d 747, 749–50 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) (agreeing 
with a Texas Court rejecting Oyler as constitutional floor, the court 
found “that basic due process requires that the defendant be informed 
of the nature of the charges he is accused and the consequences of a 
conviction before jeopardy attaches so that he is aware of the potential 
consequences of a conviction and to prepare a possible defense. . . .  [I]t 
is contrary to the basic notion of due process to return a PFO indictment 
during the trial on the underlying offense” (internal citation omitted)). 
 
Louisiana (1812) passed a repeat offender provision in 1870, and in 1880 
the Supreme Court appeared to approve of omitting the prior conviction 
from the charge, State v. Hudson, 32 La. Ann. 1052, 1053 (1880), but this 
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approach was overruled in State v. Compagno, 51 So. 681, 682 (La. 1910) 
(“[T]he first conviction . . . is an aggravation which gives rise to an 
increase of the punishment. . . .  [I]t becomes a part of the second 
offense.  It is the basis of the sentence for increasing the punishment.”).  
After Graham, a new statute in 1928 permitting postsentence allegations 
and proof before a judge was upheld as constitutional (over the dissent 
of one justice).  See State v. Guidry, 124 So. 832, 835 (La. 1929) (“There 
is no provision in the Constitution that we have been able to find which 
authorizes or requires questions of fact not pertaining to the guilt or 
innocence of a defendant to be submitted to a jury.  The act itself does 
not expressly require, nor does the language by fair implication 
authorize, the submission to a jury of the fact as to whether the 
defendant was a second offender.”).  By the 1970s, a state statute 
permitted prior offender charges to be filed after initial sentencing, 
while the defendant was incarcerated.  State v. Bullock, 329 So. 2d 733, 
736 (La. 1976) (relating history).  The courts later clarified that the 
common law rule on charging and proof for prior convictions was 
limited to statutes that enhanced a penalty for a specific type of crime.  
See State v. Skipper, 906 So. 2d 399, 416–17 (La. 2005) (holding that 
“La. R.S. 40:982 should be treated as a sentencing enhancement 
provision after conviction, like La. R.S. 15:529.1, and not as a 
substantive element of the presently-charged offense”).  Under the 
Louisiana statute providing that the judge may sentence any person 
convicted for a second or subsequent offense to a double or triple 
penalty, or to perpetual imprisonment for the fourth offense, it is held 
that the proof of the former convictions must be heard and passed on by 
the jury, since “the jury alone has authority to subject an accused party 
to the double or greater penalty . . . for the subsequent conviction.”  
State v. Bailey, 115 So. 613, 616 (La. 1927). 
 
Maine (1820), in enforcing its habitual offender law, first departed from 
the common law rule during the period from 1824 to 1897, see Jenness v. 
State, 64 A.2d 184, 185 (Me. 1949) (noting that section 18 of chapter 282 
of the Public Laws of Maine (1824) “provided that the habitual offender 
when ‘convicted’ of a felony might be sentenced for a limited term or for 
life” and that section 19, repealed in 1897, had provided that, “if the 
prior sentence was not known at the time of indictment and conviction, 
the warden and prison inspectors had authority to obtain legal process 
to have the convict tried on the fact of prior conviction”); followed it 
from 1897 through 1961, see State v. McClay, 78 A.2d 347, 352–54 (Me. 
1951) (finding charge was required by the state constitution); again 
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permitted prior offense charges to be filed after conviction but before 
sentencing from 1961 to 1999, mandating that they be included in an 
“ancillary” indictment and proven in a separate jury phase after the jury 
convicted of the underlying offense until 1989, see State v. Heald, 382 
A.2d 290, 298 (Me. 1978) (discussing dual indictment process); State v. 
Melvin, 341 A.2d 376, 380 (Me. 1975) (“[T]he Legislature provided [in 
1961] that when the existence of a prior conviction enhances the penalty 
which may be imposed on a current offense, allegation of the prior 
offense must be separate from, and its determination must be 
subsequent to, that of the current offense.” (citation omitted)); then 
made this later pleading optional from 1989 to 1999, see State v. Brooks, 
656 A.2d 1205, 1207 (Me. 1995) (“Failure to allege the previous 
conviction precludes the court from imposing the mandatory minimum 
penalty . . . .”); Landry v. State, 575 A.2d 315, 316–17 (Me. 1990) 
(quoting statute as amended in 1989); and finally returned to requiring 
such allegations up front, continuing to follow the common law rule 
today, ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17–A, § 9–A (West 2006) (“[A] prior 
conviction must be specially alleged if the sentencing provision of a 
crime requires that a present sentence be enhanced because the person 
has been previously convicted of a specified crime.”); ME. R. CRIM. P. 7 
(“If a prior conviction must be specially alleged pursuant to 17–A 
M.R.S.A. § 9–A(1) it may not be alleged in an ancillary indictment, 
information or separate count thereof but instead must be part of the 
allegations constituting the principal crime. . . .  Unless the statutory 
class for the principal crime would be elevated thereby, amendment of 
an indictment or information for purposes of 17–A M.R.S.A. § 9–A(1) 
may be made as of right by the attorney for the state at any time prior to 
the imposition of sentence on the principal crime and sentencing shall 
be continued until the attorney for the state has been afforded the 
opportunity to obtain an amended indictment if the allegation must be 
made by the grand jury.”). 
When enforcing other repeat offender provisions, Maine has 
followed the common law rule since at least 1855.  State v. Regan, 63 
Me. 127, 128 (1873) (stating in liquor law case that “[f]ormer convictions 
are alleged, with a view, undoubtedly, to increased punishment”); State 
v. Robinson, 39 Me. 150, 155 (1855) (discussing the “common thief” 
statute); see also State v. McClay, 78 A.2d 347, 352 (Me. 1951) (“This 
section, R.S. 1944, Chap. 57, Sec. 72, and its predecessors are not the 
source of the rule of criminal pleading which requires that prior 
convictions be alleged in order that enhanced penalties may or must be 
imposed upon second or subsequent offenders under statutes providing 
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therefor.  That rule has its source in the common law.  It is preserved by 
Art. I, Sec. 6 of our Constitution, supra, as a sacred right of, and a 
protection to, those accused of crime.”).  Bifurcated trials have been 
permitted in Maine for more than fifty years.  State v. Mottram, 184 
A.2d 225, 226 (Me. 1962) (“At his request he was given a separate jury 
trial on each count.  The jury hearing the larceny count was not 
informed of the ‘habitual offender’ or second count.”); see also State v. 
Sapiel, 432 A.2d 1262, 1271 (Me. 1981) (“Although 15 M.R.S.A. § 757 
requires separate trials for the principal offense and the ancillary 
proceeding, we conclude that the use of the same jury for both trials did 
not deprive the Defendant of his right to a fair trial.”). 
 
Maryland (1788) followed the common law rule on charging until 1962.  
See Swann v. State, 1 A. 872, 872 (Md. 1885); Maguire v. State, 47 Md. 
485, 496 (1878) (holding in a case of conviction for second offense 
transactions in liquor on the Sabbath, common law required that “if the 
party be proceeded against for a second or third offense under the 
statute, and the sentence prescribed be different from the first, or 
severer, by reason of its being such second or third offense, the fact thus 
relied on must be averred in the indictment; for the settled rule is, that 
the indictment must contain an averment of every fact essential to 
justify the punishment inflicted”); see also Hall v. State, 89 A. 111, 112 
(Md. 1913) (indicating that jury must find specially as to the fact of a 
prior conviction); Goeller v. State, 85 A. 954, 955 (Md. 1912) (striking 
down second offense statute that provided aggravated penalty after 
judge, not jury, found prior conviction and holding that the prior 
conviction should have been alleged in indictment and proven to jury 
under state constitution).  When it adopted second offense drug laws in 
1951, this practice of pleading and proving prior conviction allegations 
continued.  Beard v. State, 140 A.2d 672, 676, 682 (Md. 1958) (rejecting 
a constitutional requirement that the jury must pass on the accused’s 
alleged prior convictions at the same time that it passes upon the alleged 
current offense, the court noted that “in the absence of a binding 
admission by the accused of one or more prior convictions, they should 
call for special verdicts or findings as to the historical facts of any prior 
convictions which may be alleged”); Robertson v. Warden, Md. House 
of Corr., 129 A.2d 90, 91 (Md. 1957).  In 1962, new court Rule 713 
barred the inclusion of the prior conviction in the indictment, and 
instead required the state to attach to the indictment notice of the state’s 
intent to prosecute the defendant as a subsequent offender and notice of 
the defendant’s option to have the fact of his prior conviction tried 
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“concurrently with the trial for the current offense or be determined by 
the court or jury after the verdict on the current offense.”  MD. R. PROC. 
713(b) (1962) (repealed 1977) (emphasis added) (discussed in Sullivan v. 
State, 349 A.2d 663, 665 (Md. 1976)).  In 1977, the state judiciary, noting 
Oyler and Graham, adopted a new Rule 734 that was modeled on the 
court rule in place in the District of Columbia.  The new rule abandoned 
the procedure of Rule 713 and required that, prior to a guilty plea or 
trial, the state’s attorney serve a notice on the defendant or his or her 
counsel that the state will seek increased punishment as well as set forth 
each prior conviction to be relied upon.  In 1984, a failure to provide 
notice before trial of the specific convictions that would be alleged to 
aggravate the penalty was held to be harmless error.  King v. State, 477 
A.2d 768, 776 (Md. 1984); see also Lee v. State, 632 A.2d 1183, 1189–91 
(Md. 1993) (holding that notice mailed to the defendant and received a 
reasonable time prior to sentencing meets notice requirement of 
Maryland Rule 4–245(b) and satisfies due process).  Prior conviction 
allegations in Maryland must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt but 
need not be proven to a jury.  See Dove v. State, 4 A.3d 976, 987 (Md. 
2010) (“[T]he State must prove each element of the enhanced penalty 
statute beyond a reasonable doubt, including the defendant’s identity in 
the previous qualifying convictions.”); Testerman v. State, 907 A.2d 294, 
301 (Md. 2006) (finding that there was no need for “a collateral fact-
finding proceeding” because the “critical facts are not in dispute” 
(quoting In re Parris W., 770 A.2d 202, 207 (2001)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)).  
 
Massachusetts (1788) first created the optional supplemental 
information process in 1817, then returned to the common law rule later 
in the nineteenth century.  See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying 
text; McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 312 (1901) (noting that 
the prior convictions were charged in the indictment under 
Massachusetts’s habitual offender statute); Commonwealth v. 
Richardson, 55 N.E. 988, 988 (Mass. 1900) (noting that the previous 
convictions were alleged in the indictment); Tuttle v. Commonwealth, 
68 Mass. (2 Gray) 505, 506 (1854) (holding that a prior conviction 
increasing maximum sentence must be set forth in indictment); Plumbly 
v. Commonwealth, 43 Mass. (2 Met.) 413, 413–15 (1841); 
Commonwealth v. Phillips, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 28, 34 (1831) (“This 
proceeding by information to award additional punishment where 
sentence has already been pronounced, is founded solely on statute, is 
not known at the common law, is in a high degree penal, and therefore is 
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not to be extended by construction beyond the cases clearly 
contemplated by the statute.”); In re Ross, 19 Mass. (2 Pick.) 165, 170 
(1824).  In 1880, the state’s high court found that the state’s liquor law, 
which made it unnecessary to allege previous convictions in the 
complaint, was contrary to the state’s constitution.  Commonwealth v. 
Harrington, 130 Mass. 35, 36 (1880) (citing the state constitution and 
stating that “[i]t follows that the offence which is punishable with the 
higher penalty is not fully and substantially described to the defendant, 
if the complaint fails to set forth the former convictions which are 
essential features of it”); see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 24 Mass. (7 
Pick.) 177, 179–80 (1828) (setting aside defendant’s verdict when 
prosecution failed to provide “proof of identity” of the defendant’s prior 
conviction); Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 754 (1852) 
(relying on Briggs and finding failure to allege barred later penalty).  
Today, “prior convictions are no longer treated as elements,” but that 
“is irrelevant to the requirement under art. 12” of the state constitution.  
Commonwealth v. Pagan, 834 N.E.2d 240, 247 (Mass. 2005) (“If a 
defendant is made susceptible to a prescribed statutorily enhanced 
penalty because of a former conviction, the predicate offense must be 
alleged in the complaint or indictment.”).  The state constitution 
requires that “prior convictions must be alleged in the complaint or 
indictment and proved” to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Id. at 247, 
251; see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 25 (West 1998 & Supp. 
2013) (habitual offender law). 
 
Michigan (1837) followed the common law rule through the 1920s.  
People v. McDonald, 206 N.W. 516, 517 (Mich. 1925); People v. Roth, 
200 N.W. 136, 136–37 (Mich. 1924); People v. Campbell, 139 N.W. 24, 
25–26 (Mich. 1912); People v. Butler, 80 N.W. 883, 883–84 (Mich. 1899); 
People v. Buck, 67 N.W. 982, 982 (Mich. 1896); People v. Ellsworth, 36 
N.W. 236, 238–39 (Mich. 1888).  In 1929, the legislature authorized post-
conviction supplemental informations to be filed.  See People v. Eason, 
458 N.W.2d 17, 25–26 (Mich. 1990) (relating history); People v. Cairns, 
145 N.W.2d 345, 349 (Mich. 1966) (authorizing prosecutor to file 
supplemental information accusing defendant of prior convictions if “at 
any time after conviction and either before or after sentence it shall 
appear that a person convicted of a felony has previously been 
convicted” (quoting 3 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 17341 (1929)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  For part of this period, this supplemental 
information could not be filed after conviction if the prosecutor knew 
about the prior conviction before then.  The state legislature amended 
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the habitual offender statutes in 1994, making the issue of defendant’s 
status as prior offender no longer a jury question and allowing notice 
(not an information) to be filed within twenty-one days of arraignment 
with no exceptions for late discovered priors after conviction.  See 
People v. Morales, 618 N.W.2d 10, 16 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000) (tracing 
history); People v. Weatherholt, 543 N.W.2d 34, 35 (Mich. Ct. App. 
1995); see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.13 (West Supp. 2013) 
(“In a criminal action, the prosecuting attorney may seek to enhance the 
sentence of the defendant as provided under section 10, 11, or 12 of this 
chapter, by filing a written notice of his or her intent to do so within 21 
days after the defendant’s arraignment on the information charging the 
underlying offense or, if arraignment is waived, within 21 days after the 
filing of the information charging the underlying offense.” (footnote 
omitted) (citing §§ 769.10–769.12)); MICH. R. CRIM. P. 6.112 (F). 
 
Minnesota (1858) followed the common law rule on charging for its 
repeat offender provision, which passed in 1905.  MINN. STAT. § 4772 
(1905); see also State ex rel. Carmody v. Reed, 156 N.W. 127, 127 (Minn. 
1916) (“It is settled in this state in accordance with the great weight of 
authority that in order to warrant the imposition of the increased 
punishment upon second offenders the prior conviction must be charged 
in the indictment and also established on the trial, if there be a trial, and 
a verdict of the jury rendered thereon.”); State v. Findling, 144 N.W. 
142, 143–44 (Minn. 1913) (“We follow and apply the general rule, 
though it may be remarked, in passing, that entire fairness in 
prosecutions of this character would suggest some statutory change in 
the law, dispensing with the necessity of pleading the fact of prior 
conviction, and providing for the determination thereof by the court 
after conviction of the charge on trial.”).  Newer statutes authorizing 
enhanced penalties for prior conviction without pleading and proof 
before a jury have been upheld.  See, e.g., State v. Ronquist, 600 N.W.2d 
444, 450 (Minn. 1999) (noting that “provisions of section 609.346, subd. 
2a(a)(2)(iii) (1996), fall into the category of sentencing considerations 
and do not constitute elements of the crime to be proven at trial”).  
Following Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), state law 
provided for jury findings of facts that triggered aggravated sentences, 
but state courts have maintained that allegations of such facts in the 
indictment is not required.  E.g., State v. Rodriguez, No. KX-04-319, 
2006 WL 6343278, at *A-3 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 21, 2008) (noting that 
although not required by the Minnesota Constitution, “the prosecution 
did set forth the aggravating departure factors that it intended to rely 
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upon in the amended complaint in this case prior to the time the 
defendant entered his guilty pleas.  Accordingly, the defendant had 
constitutionally adequate notice of the aggravating factors that the 
prosecution intended to rely upon in this case before he entered his 
guilty pleas”). 
 
Mississippi (1817) followed the common law rule on charging until the 
1990s.  See, e.g., Hentz v. State, 542 So. 2d 914, 918 (Miss. 1989) (“The 
indictment against an habitual offender must include a charge of 
habitual offender status sufficient to satisfy notice/due process 
requirements . . . .”); Burnett v. State, 285 So. 2d 783, 785 (Miss. 1973); 
Ainsworth v. State, 40 So. 2d 298, 301 (Miss. 1949); Millwood v. State, 1 
So. 2d 582, 583 (Miss. 1941); Brewsaw v. State, 151 So. 475, 476 (Miss. 
1933); Hoggett v. State, 57 So. 812, 813 (Miss. 1912) (“Where a greater 
punishment may be inflicted for a second or subsequent violation of a 
penal law than for the first, the fact that the offense is a second or 
subsequent violation must be directly averred in the information or 
indictment, to justify the increased punishment; else it will not be 
considered as an offense for which the increased punishment can be 
inflicted, but will be deemed to be the first offense.” (quoting 10 THE 
ENCYCLOPÆDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE 489 (William M. 
McKinnery ed., 1898)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Norton v. 
State, 3 So. 665, 666 (Miss. 1888) (“The judgment of the court below was 
also erroneous for the reason that it imposed upon appellant the penalty 
prescribed for the second offense under the local option act, when there 
was no allegation in the indictment as to its being such offense.”).  A 
1995 ruling upheld an amendment to add a habitual offender notice on 
the eve of trial on the basis that it concerned only sentencing.  Burrell v. 
State, 727 So. 2d 761, 766 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998). 
 
Missouri (1821) has followed the common law rule on charging prior 
convictions under its repeat offender law since it was first enacted in 
1835.  See Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676–77 (1895) (discussing 
Missouri case law upholding its habitual offender provision); State v. 
Nolan, 316 S.W.2d 630, 633–34 (Mo. 1958) (discussing the 
constitutionality of the Habitual Criminal Act); State v. Krebs, 80 
S.W.2d 196, 198 (Mo. 1935) (discussing history); State v. Moore, 26 S.W. 
345, 346–47 (Mo. 1894) (“[S]everal previous convictions may be lawfully 
set out in the indictment when the object in setting them out is only to 
justify a severer punishment.”); State v. Austin, 21 S.W. 31, 32 (1893) 
(“[I]t needs no citations or argument to prove that the indictment under 
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it must allege all the material facts which constitute the offense, so as to 
bring the defendant within the provisions of the statute. . . .  [I]t is a 
material and essential averment that the felony charged was committed 
after a former conviction for an offense punishable by imprisonment in 
the penitentiary . . . .  There is no hardship in requiring the state to 
inform a man of the nature and cause of the accusation against him 
before requiring him to defend his life or liberty.”); State v. Lehr, 16 
Mo. App. 491, 491 (1885).  Present law requires prior offenses to be 
included in the “indictment or information, original or amended, or in 
the information in lieu of indictment,” State v. Johnson, 150 S.W.3d 132, 
136 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), but since 1959, the statute has authorized a 
judge, not the jury, to determine whether the government has proven 
those prior convictions, see State v. Morton, 338 S.W.2d 858, 861 (Mo. 
1960); see also MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.016 (West 2012); State v. Taborn, 
412 S.W.3d 466, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (striking down sentence when 
state failed to plead and prove defendant to be a persistent offender). 
 
Montana (1889) followed the common law rule until 1967, when a 
statute required “notice” of the prior conviction allegation to be 
provided to the accused before plea or trial and that the prior conviction 
allegation be tried to the court, not the jury, after conviction.  See State 
v. Cooper, 489 P.2d 99, 101–02 (Mont. 1971) (discussing Act of Feb. 28, 
1967, ch. 196, § 1, 1967 Mont. Laws 353, 400 (codified as amended at 
REV. CODE. MONT. § 95-1506); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-13-108 (West 
2013) (same process today).  Compare State v. Nelson, 304 P.2d 1110, 
1113-15 (Mont. 1956), with State v. O'Neill, 248 P. 215, 217 (Mont. 
1926), and State v. Gordon, 90 P. 173, 177 (Mont. 1907), and State v. 
Howard, 77 P. 50, 51 (Mont. 1904). 
 
Nebraska (1867) followed the common law rule on charging for its 
repeat offender provision passed in 1929, and it still does.  Wiese v. 
State, 294 N.W. 482, 484 (Neb. 1940); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (2008); 
see also Wozniak v. State, 174 N.W. 298, 299 (Neb. 1919) (same, liquor 
law passed 1917); Osborne v. State, 211 N.W. 179, 183 (Neb. 1926) 
(liquor law).  In 1947, a state statute continued to require that the prior 
offenses be included in the indictment or information but shifted 
determination of that status to the judge.  See Haffke v. State, 30 
N.W.2d 462, 469 (Neb. 1948) (“[T]he above statute by its terms applies 
only to the Habitual Criminal Act, yet it announces rules of practice and 
procedure that, as a matter of sound public policy, should apply to any 
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statute which imposes the duty upon a court to inflict a greater 
punishment upon the repetition of an offense.”). 
 
Nevada (1864) followed the common law rule on charging requiring 
inclusion in the indictment, but a 1929 Act authorized the judge to 
determine the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Howard v. 
State, 422 P.2d 548, 549 (Nev. 1967) (noting that a 1967 statute required 
inclusion in the charge but barred the jury from learning about the 
allegation during trial of the underlying offense, providing that if 
contested, the allegation would be determined by a judge beyond a 
reasonable doubt after conviction of the underlying offense); State v. 
Bardmess, 7 P.2d 817, 818 (Nev. 1932) (“[I]t is proper that he should be 
informed of the fact that his former convictions will be invoked that his 
punishment may be increased . . . .”).  For some time habitual charges 
could be brought after conviction, but a 2013 statute now requires them, 
absent a showing of good cause, to be filed before trial.  See Act of June 
1, 2013, ch. 292, § 1, 2013 Nev. Stat. 1373, 1373 (to be codified at NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.016(2)) (“Procedure; trial of primary offense; 
prior convictions”); see also NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.485(4) 
(LexisNexis 2012) (providing, for third offense (felony) domestic 
violence: “The facts concerning a prior offense must be alleged in the 
complaint, indictment or information, must not be read to the jury or 
proved at trial but must be proved at the time of sentencing and, if the 
principal offense is alleged to be a felony, must also be shown at the 
preliminary examination or presented to the grand jury” (emphasis 
added)); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 484C.400(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (same 
for third offense (felony) driving under the influence). 
 
New Hampshire (1788) followed the common law rule on charging prior 
convictions until a 2002 case, citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 
523 U.S. 224 (1998), overruled prior precedent.  See State v. LeBaron, 
808 A.2d 541, 543–45 (N.H. 2002), overruling State v. Lantaigne, 371 
A.2d 1170, 1171 (N.H. 1977) (prior conviction must be alleged in 
charge); Cedergren v. Clarke, 112 A.2d 882, 883 (N.H. 1955); State v. 
Adams, 13 A. 785, 785 (N.H. 1888) (“It is true, the heavier sentence for 
a subsequent offense cannot be imposed in the absence of an allegation 
and proof of a prior conviction.”); see also State v. Stickney, 808 A.2d 
546, 548 (N.H. 2002) (relying on LeBaron to find jury need not 
determine prior offense status); State v. McLellan, 767 A.2d 953, 957–58 
(N.H. 2001) (“[A] prior conviction need not be alleged in the 
indictment, . . . [but] the Due Process Clause of the New Hampshire 
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Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of prior 
convictions used to enhance a defendant's sentence to life without 
parole under the provisions of RSA 632-A:10-a, III.”); State v. Small, 14 
A. 727, 727 (N.H. 1888) (finding indictment deficient for second 
offense).  
 
New Jersey (1787) followed the common law rule on charging initially.  
See Weeks v. State, 127 A. 345, 345 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1925) (“Where there is 
a different and greater punishment for a second offense, the settled law 
seems to be that an offense is considered a first offense, unless a former 
offense of the same kind is alleged in the indictment and proved on the 
trial.”).  In 1931, a statute authorized dispensing with the prior offense 
allegation in specific cases and was soon upheld by the state courts as 
constitutional.  See State v. Burns, 57 A.2d 1, 2 (N.J. 1948); State v. 
Mowel, 184 A. 620, 620–21 (N.J. 1936); State v. Myers, 55 A.2d 661, 663 
(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947); State v. Rowe, 181 A. 706, 709–10 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 
1935) (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912)).  A 
supplemental accusation or information alleging the prior conviction 
was required prior to sentencing, however.  See State v. Laird, 135 A.2d 
859, 867 (N.J. 1957) (noting that “N.J.S. 2A:85–13 provides that if ‘at 
anytime, before sentence,’ a prior conviction is made to appear, the 
county prosecutor shall file an accusation charging the previous 
conviction, and there shall then be a hearing on notice to determine the 
fact”); State v. Johnson, 262 A.2d 238, 244 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1970); State v. Booker, 212 A.2d 849, 852 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1965).  Although a 1947 case seemed to suggest that statutory delegation 
of the adjudication of prior conviction allegations to the judge was 
constitutional, State v. Lutz, 52 A.2d 773, 774 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1947) (“The 
usual practice is to allege the prior convictions in the indictment, and to 
submit the factual issue thereby arising to the jury; and this course is 
obligatory save where the statute makes other adequate provision for 
the inquiry, which is not the case here.”), by 1950 it was held that proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt before a jury was required, even if the 
allegation is filed separately, see State v. Janiec, 74 A.2d 605, 607 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1950) (“It is the well settled rule that before the 
imposition of such a sentence, the defendant must be tried and 
convicted by a jury under an indictment specifically charging the prior 
convictions, or that a separate proceeding thereafter be undertaken 
before a competent court and jury to determine the liability of 
defendant to punishment as an habitual criminal and that, to meet the 
issue, the defendant has the same rights to a speedy trial, a time for 
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preparation, assistance of counsel, compulsory process for witnesses, to 
be confronted with the witnesses against him, to require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and to all other rights enjoyed by a defendant on trial 
for a criminal offense.  To impose a sentence of life imprisonment as an 
habitual criminal without conforming to the procedure mentioned, 
would be a clear violation of defendant's guaranties of due process 
under the Federal and State Constitutions.  The refusal of the defendant 
at the hearing on the Information to either admit or deny his prior 
convictions was equivalent to a plea of not guilty and clearly imposed 
upon the State the duty to proceed to have the issue tried and 
determined before the court and a jury.” (internal citations omitted)).  
In 1953, a statute provided for an independent judicial “hearing on the 
issue of habitual criminality.”  See Worbetz v. Goodman, 136 A.2d 1, 9 
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957) (“[T]he previous conviction upon 
which the increased sentence will rest may be alleged in the main 
indictment and established at trial, and an independent proceeding to 
adjudicate defendant to be an habitual criminal is unnecessary.  A plea 
of guilty or admission of the prior convictions at trial waives the need 
for formal proof by the State.”).  Today, the persistent offender statute 
requires only proof before a judge with adequate written notice.  See 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-7.1 (West 2005); State v. Franklin, 871 A.2d 
692, 699 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 
New York (1788) followed the common law rule on charging initially.  
E.g., People ex rel. Cosgriff v. Craig, 88 N.E. 38, 39 (N.Y. 1909); Johnson 
v. State, 55 N.Y. 512, 514 (N.Y. 1874) (stating “this has been the uniform 
practice in this State” regarding second offense grand larceny (emphasis 
added)); People v. Powers, 6 N.Y. 50, 51 (N.Y. 1851); People v. Youngs, 
1 Cai. 37, 39–40 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803).  This changed in 1926 when a new 
statute provided that the district attorney could file an information 
accusing the prisoner of the previous conviction after conviction or 
sentence on the underlying offense, and that allegation carried the right 
to jury trial.  Act of Apr. 16, 1926, ch. 457, § 3, 1926 N.Y. Laws 805, 805 
(codified as amended at N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1943); People v. Gowasky, 
155 N.E. 737, 739 (N.Y. 1927); People v. Simmons, 226 N.Y.S. 397, 404 
(N.Y. Kings Cnty. Ct. 1927) (“That the adoption of the latter procedure 
in this state was motivated by the same consideration that caused the 
enactment of the Massachusetts and West Virginia statutes is shown by 
the report of the Joint Legislative Committee on the co-ordination of 
civil and criminal practice acts (Baumes Committee Report) [N. Y. 
Legis. Doc. 1926, vol. 17, No. 84], page 22) . . . .” (alteration in original)); 
KING FINAL (6-30-14) (W-APP 11) (DO NOT DELETE) 7/2/2014  5:15 PM 
2014] SENTENCING AND PRIOR CONVICTIONS 587 
see also People v. Reese, 179 N.E. 305, 306 (N.Y. 1932); Howard 
McLellan, The Baumes Laws, in 6 THE REFERENCE SHELF, THE 
BAUMES LAW 48, 52–54 (Julia E. Johnson ed., 1929) (describing change 
in the law requiring wardens to “inform courts of newly discovered 
records of old offenders which may have escaped the other authorities” 
and life sentences imposed on six prisoners after their arrival at the 
prison revealed prior convictions).  Current law requires written notice 
of the allegation of prior conviction status before sentencing and an 
opportunity to insist the prior convictions be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt to a judge.  See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 400.15 (second 
violent felony offender), 400.16 (persistent violent felony offender), 
400.19 (second child sexual assault felony offender), 400.20 (persistent 
felony offender), 400.21 (second felony offender or second felony drug 
offender) (Consol. 2012). 
 
North Carolina (1789) followed the common law rule on charging from 
its beginning through most of the twentieth century, requiring the 
allegations in the initial indictment and proof to a jury.  State v. Miller, 
75 S.E.2d 242, 243 (N.C. 1953) (“Where a statute prescribes a higher 
penalty in case of repeated convictions for similar offenses, an 
indictment for a subsequent offense must allege facts showing that the 
offense charged is a second or subsequent crime within the 
contemplation of the statute in order to subject the accused to the 
higher penalty.”); State v. Fowler, 136 S.E. 709, 710 (N.C. 1927) 
(“[A]ggravated punishment prescribed for a subsequent conviction 
cannot be imposed, unless the prior conviction, which is an essential part 
of the description of the second offense, is charged in the indictment.”); 
State v. Davidson, 32 S.E. 957, 958 (N.C. 1899) (“[N]o previous 
conviction for larceny being alleged in the bill, it was erroneous to pass 
sentence of imprisonment for more than one year.”); State v. Allen, 10 
N.C. (3 Hawks) 614, 616 (N.C. 1825); State v. Daniel, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 
617, 617 (N.C. 1825); State v. Negro Adam, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 188, 190 
(N.C. 1824); State v. Woodson, 272 S.E.2d 167, 168 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980) 
(“[U]pon a proper charge of a second violation of G.S. 20-138, 
allegation and proof of the first conviction is necessary where, as here, it 
is not judicially admitted by the defendant.”); State v. Williams, 203 
S.E.2d 399, 401 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974) (“Neither of the warrants in the 
case at bar alleged that the offense charged was a fourth or subsequent 
offense, therefore, the maximum punishment authorized in either of the 
cases is a fine not exceeding $50.00 or imprisonment for not more than 
30 days.”).  A 1967 habitual offender statute permitted jury trial on prior 
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conviction allegations be postponed until after guilt on the underlying 
offense but continued to require that those allegations be filed, in a 
separate information, before trial or plea.  See State v. Allen, 233 S.E.2d 
585, 588 (N.C. 1977) (“One basic purpose behind our Habitual Felons 
Act is to provide notice to defendant that he is being prosecuted for 
some substantive felony as a recidivist.  Failure to provide such notice 
where the state accepts a guilty plea on the substantive felony charge 
may well vitiate the plea itself as not being knowingly entered with full 
understanding of the consequences.  Since the statute makes no 
distinction between guilty pleas and jury verdicts of guilt the same 
notice requirement prevails in either event.” (citations omitted)).  This 
procedure continues to be followed today.  State v. Hoskins, 736 S.E.2d 
631, 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (“During the trial on the principal offense, 
the defendant’s potential status as an habitual felon on the basis of prior 
convictions is not brought to the attention of the jury in considering the 
principal offense.  If the defendant is convicted on the principal offense, 
then the court begins the ‘habitual felon’ phase of the trial and the same 
jury determines whether the defendant has attained the status of an 
habitual felon.” (citation omitted)). 
 
North Dakota (1889) followed the common law rule on charging 
initially.  State v. O’Neal, 124 N.W. 68, 69 (N.D. 1909) (highlighting a 
state’s attorney’s failed attempt to prove such former conviction); State 
v. Markuson, 73 N.W. 82, 86–87 (N.D. 1897) (“[I]t shall be sufficient 
briefly to allege such conviction.” (quoting N.D. REV. CODES § 7614 
(1895)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  In 1927, the state 
legislature adopted the supplemental information procedure, permitting 
habitual offender allegations to be filed before sentence was fully 
executed and to be proven before a new jury.  Ryan v. Nygaard, 297 
N.W. 694, 698, 701–02 (N.D. 1941).  In cases in which the prior 
conviction increased the penalty, other than those under the habitual 
offender statute, the state courts continued to insist upon inclusion of 
prior offender allegations in the complaint, information, or indictment, 
as well as proof beyond a reasonable doubt to the jury.  State v. Edinger, 
331 N.W.2d 553, 555 (N.D. 1983); State v. Ruble, 40 N.W.2d 794, 803 
(N.D. 1950).  In 1987, the state’s high court held that a written statement 
of prior convictions would provide sufficient notice under the Sixth 
Amendment and that specific convictions need not be alleged in the 
charging instrument.  State v. Gahner, 413 N.W.2d 359, 363 (N.D. 1987).  
Today, several statutes require prior offense allegations to be included 
in the complaint, information, or indictment, see N.D. CENT. CODE 
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ANN. § 19-03.1-23(5) (LexisNexis 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12.1-
23-11(3) (LexisNexis 2012), or filed prior to plea or trial, see id. § 12.1-
32-09(3)).  The state bifurcates jury proceedings for dangerous special 
offender cases, but not habitual offender allegations, which are decided 
by the judge.  Id. § 12.1-32-09(4).  Defendants may stipulate to prior 
convictions, barring proof before the jury.  State v. Tutt, 732 N.W.2d 
382, 384 (N.D. 2007). 
 
Ohio (1803) followed the common law rule on charging initially with 
increased penalties for subsequent offenders, see Larney v. City of 
Cleveland, 34 Ohio St. 599, 600–01(Ohio 1878) (“The rule, and the 
principle upon which it is founded, are well stated by Mr. Bishop: 
‘Where the offense is the first, or is prosecuted as such, the indictment 
need not charge it to be the first, for this is presumed.  But if it be the 
second or third, and the sentence is to be heavier by reason of its being 
such, the fact thus relied on must be averred in the indictment; because, 
by the rules of criminal pleading, the indictment must always contain an 
averment of every fact essential to the punishment to be inflicted.’  See 1 
Bish. Cr. L., 6th ed., § 961, and cases there cited.  The same rule applies 
to an information.” (quoting JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, COMMENTARIES 
ON THE CRIMINAL LAW § 961 (6th ed. 1877)), and in its first habitual 
offender law in the late 1880s, see In re Kline, 6 Ohio C.C. 215, 216–17 
(Cir. Ct. 1892) (noting that the previous felonies were charged in the 
indictment).  It did so until 1987, when it stopped requiring such 
allegations be pleaded or proved as elements “where the existence of a 
prior conviction enhances the penalty for a subsequent offense, but does 
not elevate the degree thereof.”  See State v. Allen, 506 N.E.2d 199, 201 
(Ohio 1987).  Pleading and proof before a jury continues to be required 
when the prior conviction elevates the degree of crime.  See State v. 
Gordon, 276 N.E.2d 243, 245 (Ohio 1971) (“[T]he question of a prior 
conviction is an essential element of the offense charged, and is an issue 
of fact to be determined by a jury.” (quoting Sparkman v. State Prison 
Custodian, 18 So. 2d 772, 774 (Fla. 1944)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)); State v. Day, 651 N.E.2d 52, 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994) (“A 
prior conviction which raises the degree of a later offense is an element 
of the subsequent offense.”); State v. Miller, No. CA2011-02-13, 2012 
WL 764907 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 12, 2012) (following Day). 
 
Oregon (1859) followed the common law rule on charging from the 
outset.  State v. Newlin, 182 P. 133, 135 (Or. 1919) (finding “that it was 
error to adjudge the defendant guilty of a second offense and sentence 
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him accordingly, in the absence of an allegation in the indictment 
charging the prior conviction, and this seems to be the general holding 
of the courts”); id. at 136 (“[S]uch a sentence was not authorized in the 
absence of a proper allegation in the indictment.”).  The rule was 
codified in 1921 but repealed with the enactment of a new habitual 
offender law in 1927, adopting the supplemental information procedure 
permitting allegations of prior convictions to be filed after sentencing, 
then proved to a new jury.  The statute was upheld in 1929.  See State v. 
Smith, 273 P. 323, 325 (Or. 1929) (citing Graham v. West Virginia, 224 
U.S. 616 (1912)); see also State v. Waterhouse, 307 P.2d 327, 332 (Or. 
1957) (noting that from 1927 through 1957, even as reenacted and 
amended, “the habitual criminal law has provided a post trial procedure 
for proving prior offenses”).  The state continued to require that prior 
conviction allegations be included in the initial charge in cases in which 
the legislature had not provided for an alternative procedure.  Id. at 
332–33.  Reacting to the Waterhouse decision, the state legislature 
provided in 1961 that all such prior conviction allegations be omitted 
from the indictment and proven to the court, a provision upheld against 
constitutional challenge in 1963.  State v. Hoffman, 385 P.2d 741, 744 
(Or. 1963).  Today, these allegations need not be included in the 
indictment.  See State v. Reinke, 309 P.3d 1059, 1060, 1067 (Or. 2013) 
(“[T]he facts necessary to impose a dangerous offender sentence [must] 
be found by the grand jury and pleaded in the indictment. . . .  [T]he 
legislature has provided that a prosecutor need not plead sentence 
enhancement facts in the indictment.  Timely written notice will suffice.  
Defendant's constitutional challenge under Article VII (Amended), 
section 5, fails.” (internal citations omitted) (citing OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 136.765 (2013))). 
 
Pennsylvania (1787) followed the common law rule initially, Rauch v. 
Commonwealth, 78 Pa. 490, 490 (Pa. 1875) (“[T]o subject the defendant 
to imprisonment it must be charged in the indictment that he had before 
been convicted of such offence; the rule applies to misdemeanors as well 
as felonies.”); Smith v. Commonwealth, 14 Serg. & Rawle 69, 70 (Pa. 
1826), until 1929, when it gave its prosecutors up to two years after a 
defendant was sentenced to charge him as a repeat offender and boost 
his sentence, see Commonwealth ex rel. Foster v. Ashe, 8 A.2d 542 (Pa. 
1939) (citing Act of Apr. 29, 1929, no. 854, § 4 (codified as amended at 
19 PA. STAT. § 924)).  Section 9714(d) of title 42 of the Pennsylvania 
Statutes now vests discretion in the sentencing judge and has been 
clearly recognized by Pennsylvania’s highest state court.  
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Commonwealth v. Samuel, 961 A.2d 57, 176–80 (Pa. 1943).  For other 
crimes with higher penalties for subsequent offenses, allegations were to 
be included in the indictment, but the prior conviction allegations were 
to be kept from the jury, permitting the defendant to decide if and when 
convicted, whether to contest them.  Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 155 
A.2d 825, 831 (Pa. 1959); Commonwealth v. Orwan, 18 Pa. D. & C.2d 
423, 428 (Ct. Quar. Sess. 1959) (“We would add thereto that should the 
jury find defendant guilty of one or more of the offenses set forth in the 
copy of the original indictments with the averment of prior conviction 
deleted, the jury should not be discharged until defendant answers the 
rule to show cause.  Should he deny his identity as the person formerly 
convicted, the question of his identity would then become a jury 
question.”); Commonwealth v. Scott, 54 Pa. D. & C. 243, 252 (Pa. Ct. 
Quar. Sess., Dauphin Cnty. 1945).  Waivers of the right to notice and 
proof were also upheld.  Commonwealth v. Moses, 271 A.2d 339, 340 
(Pa. 1970) (“The lower court lacked the power to impose this enlarged 
sentence when the indictment did not contain averments of prior 
convictions.”); Commonwealth ex rel. Firmstone v. Burke, 103 A.2d 476, 
479 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1954).  In 2004, the state’s high court held that 
Apprendi’s exception for prior convictions supported the conclusion that 
failure to plead and prove to a jury a prior conviction that raises the 
maximum sentence does not violate either the federal or state 
constitution.  Commonwealth v. Aponte, 855 A.2d 800, 811 (Pa. 2004) 
(“Where . . . the judicial finding is the fact of a prior conviction, 
submission to a jury is unnecessary, since the prior conviction is an 
objective fact that initially was cloaked in all the constitutional 
safeguards, and is now a matter of public record.”). 
 
Rhode Island (1790) followed the common law rule on charging initially.  
See State v. Flynn, 11 A. 170, 171 (R.I. 1887) (construing a statute 
punishing “every person who shall have been convicted three times 
within a period of six months of intoxication, under such circumstances 
as to amount to a violation of decency, or who shall be proved to have 
been thus intoxicated three several times within a period of six weeks, 
shall be deemed a common drunkard” (quoting Act of 1882, ch. 244, 
§ 24, 1882 R.I. Pub. Laws 684, 688) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
It enacted its first habitual offender provision in 1896.  By 1956, the 
statute permitted the state to bring habitual allegations after sentencing, 
to be determined by a judge.  State v. DeMasi, 420 A.2d 1369, 1370 (R.I. 
1980).  Since at least 1983 the state courts have rejected any requirement 
to plead the prior conviction allegations in the indictment.  See State v. 
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Hall, 940 A.2d 645, 660 (R.I. 2008); State v. Sitko, 457 A.2d 260, 262 
(R.I. 1983) (noting recidivism allegation must be made before 
sentencing).  Currently, the statute requires notice be provided “within 
forty-five (45) days of the arraignment, but in no case later than the date 
of the pretrial conference.”  R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-19-21 (2002 & 
Supp. 2013). 
 
South Carolina (1788) permitted increased penalties for subsequent 
convictions without allegations in the indictment in 1832.  State v. Allen, 
42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.) 448, 449 (S.C. 1832) (“If, upon a verdict of guilty, the 
solicitor is able to produce the record of a former conviction of the 
prisoner for horse stealing, he may move for sentence of death, which 
the Court would be bound to pass.”); State v. Smith, 42 S.C.L. (8 Rich.) 
460 (S.C. 1832); see also State v. Parris, 71 S.E. 808, 809 (S.C. 1911) 
(relying on Smith and Allen and finding that the previous conviction 
allegation should have been stricken from the indictment).  Such 
information had to be included in the indictment when the information 
is necessary to establish jurisdiction of the court.  Tyler v. State, 145 
S.E.2d 434, 435 (S.C. 1965) (“[T]he allegation of the indictment that the 
crime charged was a second or subsequent offense was necessary to 
show the jurisdiction of the court.”).  In 1995, the state’s habitual 
offender statute was amended to require notice at least ten days before 
trial.  Act effective Jan. 1, 1996, 1995 S.C. Acts 568 (discussing 
amendment); State v. Burdette, 515 S.E.2d 525, 527 (S.C. 1999). 
 
South Dakota (1889) followed the common law rule on charging 
initially, including allegations of prior convictions that raised the penalty 
in the indictment.  E.g., State v. Kinney, 221 N.W. 250, 250 (S.D. 1928) 
(“[A] former conviction is an essential element of the second or 
subsequent offense charged as a felony, and, being an essential element 
of the crime, must be alleged in the information and proved on the 
trial.”); State v. Schaller, 207 N.W. 161, 161 (S.D. 1926) (stating, in a 
liquor case, that “[i]t is a well-established rule that, where the statute 
imposes an additional penalty for subsequent convictions, the 
information upon the subsequent offense should allege the prior 
conviction”); State v. Carlisle, 139 N.W. 127, 130 (S.D. 1912) (allegation 
included in indictment).  Under the 1919 habitual offender act, prior 
convictions were alleged in the indictment.  E.g., State ex rel. King v. 
Jameson, 13 N.W.2d 46, 48 (S.D. 1944); State v. King, 252 N.W. 36, 37 
(S.D. 1934).  In 1927, the state adopted a version of New York’s habitual 
offender statute, permitting a separate, supplemental information to be 
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filed after conviction and a sentence on the underlying offense to be 
tried to a jury.  See State ex rel. Smith v. Jameson, 19 N.W.2d 505, 506 
(S.D. 1945); State v. DeMarsche, 1 N.W.2d 67, 68–69 (S.D. 1941) 
(finding a greater penalty may not be imposed after initial sentencing if 
judge knew of prior convictions at initial sentencing).  Other statutes 
increasing the degree of offense for defendants with prior convictions 
also required a separate “Part II” information charging those 
convictions be filed with the initial charge.  Black v. Erickson, 191 
N.W.2d 174, 176–77 (S.D. 1971) (“Our procedure requires the allegation 
of prior convictions to be included in the information charging the 
principal offense as Part II thereof.  SDCL 23-32-9. . . . [O]ur habitual 
criminal procedure ‘satisfies due process by granting an accused timely 
and formal notice of the alleged prior convictions before pleading to the 
primary charge.’” (quoting State v. Steffenson, 178 N.W.2d 561 (S.D. 
1970))).  The two-step charging process is still followed, and from 1959 
to 2005, the statute required “[a]ny allegation that a defendant is an 
habitual criminal shall be filed as a separate information at the time of, 
or before, arraignment.”  S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-11 (2006).  In 
2004, an amendment allowed a judge to grant permission to file after the 
arraignment, “but no less than thirty days before the commencement of 
trial or entry of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”  Id.  The defendant 
has a right to a jury determination of the prior offense allegations.  Id. 
§ 22-7-12 (“The defendant shall also be informed of the right to a trial 
by jury on the issue of whether the defendant is the same person as 
alleged in the habitual criminal information.”). 
 
Tennessee (1796) followed the common law rule on charging until a 
1917 statute provided that the prior conviction required for an increased 
penalty for second offense liquor violation need not be alleged in the 
indictment.  In a 1930 decision, it was upheld as consistent with Graham.  
See McCummings v. State, 134 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tenn. 1939); Tipton v. 
State, 28 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tenn. 1930).  This scheme, however, was 
struck down in the federal courts as violating due process by not 
providing adequate notice.  See Edwards v. Rhea, 238 F.2d 850, 851 (6th 
Cir. 1956), aff’g 136 F. Supp. 671, 682–83 (M.D. Tenn. 1955) (finding the 
statute fails to provide due process and granting writ of habeas corpus).  
Perhaps anticipating this problem, the state legislature in 1950 amended 
the statute to require inclusion of prior conviction allegations in the 
indictment.  See State v. Wyrick, 62 S.W.3d 751, 764 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
2001).  Thereafter, state court decisions followed the common law rule.  
E.g., Warden v. State, 381 S.W.2d 244, 246 (Tenn. 1964) (“[W]here a 
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statute provides for proof of prior convictions and requires increased 
punishment for second or subsequent offenses, the indictment, in order 
to charge a second or subsequent offense, must aver not only the 
convictions of prior offenses, but also such circumstances of time and 
place as to inform the accused of what proofs of prior offenses may be 
offered against him and enable him to be prepared to make his defense; 
and an indictment failing in these requisites is invalid and a conviction 
based thereon is void.”); State v. Sanders, 735 S.W.2d 856, 857–58 
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1987) (finding that “[a]n accused, who has been 
convicted of driving while under the influence, may not be sentenced as 
a recidivist unless his prior conviction or convictions for driving while 
under the influences are alleged in the indictment or charging 
instrument,” and that it was error for judge rather than jury to find prior 
conviction).  The state’s habitual offender statute was repealed in 1989.  
Judges now find prior convictions at sentencing for multiple, persistent, 
and career offenders, and the statute has withstood challenges under 
Apprendi, e.g., Morris v. Fortner, No. M2008-01022-CCA-R3-HC, 2009 
WL 690304, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 26, 2009), but it continues to 
require notice of prior convictions that will increase penalty prior to 
plea or trial, TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-202 (2010).  The common law 
rule continues to be followed for other repeat offender statutes.  See 
State v. Cross, 362 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tenn. 2012) (requiring that, for a 
subsequent driving under the influence offense, prior offenses must be 
alleged in indictment and a bifurcated jury proceeding used, so that if 
the jury convicts, it would then be informed of the prior conviction 
allegations). 
 
Texas (1845) followed the common law rule on charging, see Long v. 
State, 36 Tex. 6, 10 (Tex. 1872) (stating that conviction must be alleged, 
citing the commentaries of Joel Prentiss Bishop), and until 2006 Texas 
continued to require notice before trial, although it held grand jury 
review was not required, Brooks v. State, 957 S.W.2d 30, 34 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 1997).  In 2006, state courts upheld notice provided after trial but 
before sentencing.  See Pelache v. State, 324 S.W.3d 568, 577 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2010) (“[F]or purposes of conducting a due-process analysis, the 
determination of whether proper notice of enhancements was given 
does not require that notice be given within a particular period of time 
before trial or before the guilt phase is completed.”); Villescas v. State, 
189 S.W.3d 290, 294 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (noting that “due process 
does not even require that the notice be given before the guilt phase 
begins, much less that it be given a number days before trial” (citing 
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Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962))).  Current law requires 
“enhancement” allegations to be provided before plea and trial.  
 
Utah (1896) followed the common law rule on charging initially, see 
State v. Anderson, 286 P. 645, 645 (Utah 1930); State v. Bruno, 256 P. 
109, 110 (Utah 1927) (noting that the state must allege and prove prior 
conviction beyond reasonable doubt to convict as persistent violator); 
State v. Aime, 220 P. 704, 704 (Utah 1923); State v. Hurst, 205 P. 335, 337 
(Utah 1922), and continues to do so today for its habitual offender 
statute, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013) 
(“The prosecuting attorney, or grand jury if an indictment is returned, 
shall provide notice in the information or indictment that the defendant 
is subject to punishment as a habitual violent offender under this 
section.”).  For other repeat offender enhancements, however, state 
courts have held that although pretrial notice is required, a separate jury 
finding is not.  State v. Angus, 581 P.2d 992, 995 (Utah 1978) (firearm 
enhancement); State v. Martinez, 896 P.2d 38, 41 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) 
(regarding the multiple sex offender enhancement: “because the 
enhancement is a punishment, it is most reasonable to view these 
requirements as coming into play at the sentencing phase of the 
prosecution”). 
 
Vermont (1791) courts continue to follow the common law rule.  See 
State v. Brillon, 995 A.2d 557, 563 (Vt. 2010); State v. Cameron, 227 
A.2d 276, 280 (Vt. 1967).  The Supreme Court in Apprendi noted that 
another opinion, State v. Freeman, 27 Vt. 523 (1855), authorized 
increased punishment for violation of a liquor law on proof of prior 
convictions without the necessity of pleading them, observing that “the 
court did not hold that the prior conviction was not an element; instead, 
it held that the liquor law created only minor offenses that did not 
qualify as crimes.  Thus, the state constitutional protections that would 
attach were a ‘crime’ at issue did not apply.”  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 508 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Freeman, 27 
Vt. at 527). 
 
Virginia (1788) provided for higher punishment for second offenders in 
an act of 1796.  See Rand v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 738, 746 
(1852) (“If any person convicted of . . . a felony . . . shall commit any 
such offence a second time, and shall be thereof legally convicted, he 
shall be sentenced to undergo an imprisonment in said penitentiary-
house, at hard labor during life . . . .” (quoting Act of Dec. 15, 1796, ch. 
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200, § 24, 1803 Va. Acts 355, 358) (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
The state initially followed the common law rule.  Commonwealth v. 
Welsh, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 57, 57 (1817) (reversing sentence because “the 
Information in this Case does not state that it is an Information for a 
second offense, of retailing spirituous liquors, without license, after 
having been before convicted of a similar offense”).  But in 1819, the 
legislature authorized, as an alternative to the common law procedure, 
recidivist status to be alleged and adjudicated after conviction.  Rand, 50 
Va. (9 Gratt.) at 752–53; Brooks v. Commonwealth, 41 Va. (2 Rob.) 
845–46 (1843); Commonwealth v. Bryant, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 465, 466 
(1825); L. L. C., Jr. & T. G. L., supra note 12.  Prior conviction 
allegations continued to be included in the indictment in second offense 
larceny and liquor prosecutions.  Toler v. Commonwealth, 51 S.E.2d 
210, 214 (Va. 1949); Keeney v. Commonwealth, 137 S.E. 478, 482 (1927); 
Kelley v. Commonwealth, 125 S.E. 437, 438 (Va. 1924); Staples v. 
Commonwealth, 125 S.E. 319, 320 (Va. 1924); Cooper v. 
Commonwealth, 113 S.E. 863, 863 (Va. 1922); Shiflett v. 
Commonwealth, 77 S.E. 606, 607 (1913) (“It is well settled that where an 
offense is punishable with a higher penalty, because it is a second or 
subsequent offense of the same kind, such severer punishment cannot 
be inflicted unless the indictment charges that it is a second or 
subsequent offense, because by the rules of criminal pleading the 
indictment must always contain an averment of every fact essential to 
the punishment to be inflicted.”); Pryor v. Commonwealth, 26 S.E. 864, 
865 (Va. 1897); White v. Commonwealth, 79 Va. 611, 615 (1884); Stroup 
v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. (1 Rob.) 754, 754 (1842).  As additional 
repeat-offense provisions were added, allegations of prior offenses 
continued to be required in the indictment.  See Triplett v. 
Commonwealth, 186 S.E.2d 16, 17 (Va. 1972) (repeat offense for driving 
an automobile while under the influence); Young v. Commonwealth, 
156 S.E. 565, 566 (Va. 1931) (same); Sears v. Commonwealth, 510 S.E.2d 
274, 276 (Va. Ct. App. 1999) (same); see also Washington v. 
Commonwealth, 616 S.E.2d 774, 779–83 (Va. Ct. App. 2005) 
(Humphreys, J., concurring) (collecting multiple statutes that make a 
prior conviction an element of a greater offense and stating that “this 
Court and the Virginia Supreme Court have consistently held that, for a 
defendant to be convicted under a recidivist statute, the prior 
convictions must be charged in the indictment and proved to the jury”).  
Nevertheless, Virginia courts consider this rule subject to change by the 
legislature.  For example, in 1993, a state court held that, under the drug 
statute, prior offenses need not be alleged in the indictment in order to 
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impose repeat offender penalties.  See Able v. Commonwealth, 431 
S.E.2d 337, 341–42 (Va. Ct. App. 1993). 
 
Washington (1889) followed the common law rule for its repeat-liquor 
violation offense.  State v. Dale, 188 P. 473, 476 (Wash. 1920); State v. 
Dereiko, 182 P. 597, 598 (Wash. 1919).  But in 1903, it adopted the 
supplemental information procedure for its habitual criminal law.  See 
State v. Cotz, 161 P. 1191, 1192 (Wash. 1916); State v. Driscoll, 150 P. 2, 
3 (Wash. 1915); State v. Rowan, 146 P. 374, 375 (Wash. 1915); State v. 
Miller, 138 P. 896, 899 (Wash. 1914); State v. Le Pitre, 103 P. 27, 28 
(Wash. 1909).  Even after a revised statute omitted express reference to 
the jury trial, it was held that the defendant has a right to jury trial on 
the prior conviction allegations.  See State v. Furth, 104 P.2d 925, 930 
(Wash. 1940); State ex rel. Edelstein v. Huneke, 249 P. 784, 785 (Wash. 
1926).  The statute was replaced by a three strikes statute in the mid-
1990s that provided for judicial findings on prior convictions.  In 
upholding that statute, the state’s high court in a split decision held that, 
although state precedent conflicted “regarding whether the habitual 
criminals act contained ‘elements’ of a ‘charge’ or was simply a 
sentencing enhancement statute,” a jury trial, proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt, and “formal charging” were not “constitutionally 
mandated” but that “early notice of the potential sentence” was 
“appropriate.”  State v. Thorne, 921 P.2d 514, 533–35 (Wash. 1996); see 
also State v. Smith, 75 P.3d 934, 942 (Wash. 2003).  In 1969, it was held 
that when greater penalties followed proof of a prior conviction in drug 
offenses, neither allegations in the indictment or proof at trial was 
required, even though they were for other facts that raised the penalty.  
State v. Nass, 456 P.2d 347, 349 (Wash. 1969). 
 
West Virginia (1863) took with it Virginia’s supplemental charging 
procedure that departed from the common law rule when West Virginia 
was organized as a separate state.  See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 
U.S. 616, 623 (1912) (noting that state provisions “were derived 
from . . . the Code of Virginia of 1860”); State v. Graham, 69 S.E. 1010 
(W. Va. 1910).  In 1943, an amendment “provided that the statute 
should be invoked only by information filed after conviction rather than 
by allegation in the indictment upon which the subject was being 
prosecuted for a substantive offense.”  See Oyler v. Boyles, 368 U.S. 448, 
451–52 n.5 (1962).  A jury decision is still required absent waiver, and, 
although the supplemental information may be filed after the initial 
sentence, it must be filed in the same term of court as the original 
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conviction.  See Holcomb v. Ballard, 752 S.E.2d 284, 287–88 (W. Va. 
2013) (“[A] trial court is obligated to arraign a defendant on a recidivist 
information during the term of court in which the defendant is 
convicted.”).  
 
Wisconsin (1848) followed the common law rule on charging for its 
repeat-larceny statutes.  Ingalls v. State, 4 N.W. 785, 791 (Wis. 1880); 
Rolke v. State, 12 Wis. 570, 570 (1860).  It followed the same rule for its 
repeat-offense liquor statutes as well.  See Watson v. State, 208 N.W. 
897, 898 (Wis. 1926); Paetz v. State, 107 N.W. 1090, 1091 (Wis. 1906) 
(“This doctrine appears to be so well established that we deem 
discussion of it wholly unnecessary.  The following are some of the many 
authorities in support of the doctrine that where the statute provides a 
heavier penalty for the second offense, the first must be alleged in the 
indictment and proved upon the trial in order to warrant conviction and 
punishment for a second offense.” (citations omitted)).  Courts required 
the prior conviction be alleged before trial in an information before trial 
but did not require them to be proven along with other elements at the 
preliminary examination.  Dahlgren v. State, 157 N.W. 531, 532 (Wis. 
1916).  Its habitual offender statute required that allegations of prior 
convictions be included in the indictment.  See WIS. REV. STAT. ch. 193, 
§§ 4736–4738 (1878).  A defendant had the right to a jury finding of a 
prior conviction that increased the penalty.  See Green Bay Fish Co. v. 
State, 202 N.W. 667, 670 (Wis. 1925). 
 
Wyoming (1890) followed the common law rule on charging initially and 
still does.  See Schuler v. State, 668 P.2d 1333, 1337–38 (Wyo. 1983) 
(“Prosecutors seeking enhanced sentences under the habitual-criminal 
statute must bring allegations of habitual criminality under § 6–1–110, 
W.S.1977 (see n. 1) in the same information with the underlying felony 
charge. . . .  [T]he long history of criminal pleading in this state requiring 
a single information to charge both the underlying felony and the prior 
felonies upon which the State relies to enhance the punishment . . . .”); 
Bandy v. Hehn, 67 P. 979, 980 (Wyo. 1902) (“[A]s the fact of a former 
conviction enters into the offense to the extent of aggravating it and 
increasing the punishment, it must be alleged in the information and 
proved like any other material fact, if it is sought to impose the greater 
penalty.”). 
